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Unlike conventional weapons or remotely operated drones, autonomous weapon
systems can independently select and engage targets. As a result, they may take actions
that look like war crimes—the sinking of a cruise ship, the destruction of a village,
the downing of a passenger jet—without any individual acting intentionally or
recklessly. Absent such willful action, no one can be held criminally liable under
existing international law.
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Criminal law aims to prohibit certain actions, and individual criminal liability
allows for the evaluation of whether someone is guilty of a moral wrong. Given that
a successful ban on autonomous weapon systems is unlikely (and possibly even
detrimental), what is needed is a complementary legal regime that holds states
accountable for the injurious wrongs that are the side effects of employing these
uniquely effective but inherently unpredictable and dangerous weapons. Just as the
Industrial Revolution fostered the development of modern tort law, autonomous
weapon systems highlight the need for “war torts”: serious violations of international
humanitarian law that give rise to state responsibility.
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INTRODUCTION
“There can be no justice in war if there are not, ultimately, responsible men and women.”1

Imagine a marine autonomous weapon system, armed with torpedoes,
designed to patrol within a preset region and attack anything it identifies as
an enemy warship. Is anyone liable if it sinks a cruise ship, resulting in the
deaths of all aboard? Or envision a mobile, land-based autonomous weapon
system, meant to provide force protection, that enters a remote village and
kills every man, woman, and child it encounters. Who is responsible for that
massacre? On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines flight MH17 was shot down over
eastern Ukraine, resulting in the deaths of all 298 individuals on board.2 Many
were quick to argue that this action should have spurred prosecution, either
as a war crime under international law or as murder under domestic criminal
laws.3 But if an autonomous weapon system had fired the missile that downed
the plane, could anyone be held accountable?
Autonomous weapon systems are fundamentally different from prior forms
of weaponry: their capacity for self-determined action makes them uniquely
effective and uniquely unpredictable. Unlike conventional weapons or remotely
operated drones, an autonomous weapon system can select and engage targets
without human direction or oversight.4 And unlike landmines, trip-wire
sentry guns, or other automated weapon systems, autonomous weapon
systems do not simply react to preset triggers. Instead, they gather
information from their environment and make independent calculations as to

1 MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL
ILLUSTRATIONS 288 (2d ed. 1992).
2 MH17 Malaysia Plane Crash: What We Know, BBC (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/ news/
world-europe-28357880 [https://perma.cc/8SRB-U9KW].
3 See, e.g., Alexis Flynn, Will the MH17 Disaster Be Prosecuted as a War Crime?, WALL ST. J. (July
22, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/07/22/will-the-mh17-disaster-be-prosecuted-asa-war-crime [https://perma.cc/B3BQ-DXTE]; Kevin Jon Heller, MH17 Should Be Framed as Murder,
Not as a War Crime, OPINIO JURIS (Aug. 11, 2014, 9:33 AM), http://opiniojuris. org/2014/08/11/mh17-framed-murder-war-crime [https://perma.cc/HFJ5-EXG7].
4 Rebecca Crootof, The Killer Robots Are Here: Legal and Policy Implications, 36 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1837, 1842 (2015) [hereinafter Crootof, Killer Robots] (defining an “autonomous weapon system”
as “a weapon system that, based on conclusions derived from gathered information and
preprogrammed constraints, is capable of independently selecting and engaging targets”); see also
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 3000.09, AUTONOMY IN WEAPON SYSTEMS 13-14 (2012)
(defining “autonomous weapon systems” as ones which, “once activated, can select and engage
targets without further intervention by a human operator”). Most drones in operation today are
merely semi-autonomous, insofar as they require a human operator both to select and engage targets.
Crootof, Killer Robots, supra, at 1844 n.10.
Contrary to the general consensus, autonomous weapon systems are not some possible futuristic
weaponry; rather, they exist and have been integrated into states’ armed forces. Id. at 1840 (mentioning
the examples of China, Russia, South Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States).
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how to act.5 The sheer complexity of autonomous weapon systems’ methods
for making these determinations may make it impossible for human beings
to predict what the systems will do,6 especially to the extent they operate in
complex environments and are subject to various types of malfunction and
corruption. More advanced autonomous weapon systems might even “learn”
from in-field experiences or make probabilistic calculations.7
Given their destructive capacity and their inherent unpredictability, if
autonomous weapon systems continue to be fielded, they will inevitably be
involved in an accident with devastating and deadly consequences. Assuming
that no one intended for the accident to occur or acted recklessly, it is unlikely
that any person could be held individually liable under existing international
criminal law. By definition, war crimes—serious violations of international
humanitarian law that give rise to individual criminal liability8—must be
committed by a person acting “willfully,” which is usually understood as
acting intentionally or recklessly.9 By challenging the presumption that
5 Any attempt to distinguish between automated and autonomous systems based on their level of
complexity runs into a line-drawing problem. And yet, the fact that some systems and not others are
capable of conducting in-field, program-based, independent analysis does seem to be a relevant distinction,
insofar as their actions are not entirely predetermined or predictable. See id at 1855-56; see also PAUL
SCHARRE, AUTONOMOUS WEAPONS AND OPERATIONAL RISK 12 (2016) http://www.cnas.org/
sites/default/files/publications-pdf/CNAS_Autonomous-weapons-operational-risk.pdf [https://perma.cc
/72G9-CYRB] (describing different categories of autonomy and distinguishing them from the complexity
of the system, the level of human supervision, and the task the system is designed to perform).
6 It is tempting to suggest that responsibility for a given action can subsequently be determined
by “looking at the code”—but this underestimates the sheer complexity of modern systems. See, e.g.,
Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. &
TECH. L. REV. 272, 284 (2011) (“[P]rograms with millions of lines of code are written by teams of
programmers, none of whom knows the entire program; hence, no individual can predict the effect
of a given command with absolute certainty, since portions of large programs may interact in
unexpected, untested ways.”).
7 See Ryan Calo, Robotics and the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 538-45 (2015) (discussing
robotic “emergence,” the ability of robotic systems to adapt to circumstances and “learn” from mistakes).
8 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 94 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm [https://perma.cc/KT77-8AFL] (stating that a
war crime requires a “serious” violation of international humanitarian law that entails “the individual
criminal responsibility of the person breaching the rule”); ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 65-66 (3d ed. 2013) (same); see also Rule 156. Definition of War Crimes, INT’L
COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.
org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule156 [https://perma.cc/E3P3-9LHM] (last visited Apr. 15,
2016) [hereinafter ICRC Rule 156] (“[State p]ractice in the form of legislation, military manuals and
case-law shows that war crimes are violations committed either by members of the armed forces or
by civilians . . . .”).
9 See, e.g., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL
PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at 994 (Yves
Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski & Bruno Zimmermann eds., 1987), http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/
Military_Law/pdf/Commentary_GC_Protocols.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XKM-QQYV] [hereinafter
ICRC COMMENTARY]; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber
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serious violations of international humanitarian law will not occur absent
willful human action, autonomous weapon systems threaten to destabilize
nearly seventy years of efforts to establish international criminal law.
Individual criminal liability for war crimes grew from a deep-seated desire
to hold individuals accountable for atrocities and to discourage future
occurrences.10 Criminal law is useful for creating and enforcing prohibitions,
and it therefore provides an appropriate liability regime for genocide, slavery,
massacres, systematic rape, and other such outrages. But while autonomous
weapon systems are capable of committing serious violations of international
humanitarian law with tragic consequences, they are too useful to be
criminalized. Not only do they offer a seductive combination of distance,
accuracy, and lethality, this uniquely effective weaponry may prove to be more
“humane” than human beings on the battlefield. Given their inherent value
and their attendant risk, what is needed is a legal regime that regulates, rather
than prohibits, the use of autonomous weapon systems. Enter tort law.
Oddly, there is no well-developed field of international tort law. Many
domestic legal subjects have an international corollary: there is civil rights
law and international human rights law, intellectual property law and
international intellectual property law, contracts and bilateral trade treaties.
But tort law—the legal regime governing those noncontractual civil wrongs
for which an individual can seek redress—does not have an obvious
international doppelgänger.11 Environmental lawyers have long been trying
to create international tort liability for transnational environmental damage,
but their efforts have borne little fruit.12 Article 75 of the Rome Statute of the
Judgment, ¶¶ 437, 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.
icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AX-3ZXB].
10 While many attribute this development to the Nuremberg trials, see, e.g., Edoardo Greppi, The
Evolution of Individual Criminal Responsibility Under International Law, 81 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 531,
536-37 (1999) (“It was only after the Second World War that a movement started up within the
international community which clearly began to shape a deeper consciousness of the need to prosecute
serious violations of the laws of war, with regard both to the traditional responsibility of States and to
the personal responsibility of individuals.” (footnotes omitted)), individual criminal liability for
violations of the law of war significantly predates Nuremberg, see infra subsection I.B.1.
11 See, e.g., Declaration of Kenneth Howard Anderson Jr. at 46, In re “Agent Orange” Prod.
Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (N. 04-400) (“Although international law in narrow
circumstances does provide for individual criminal liability, it does not generally provide for civil
liability—not even for individuals, let alone for corporations.”). States, however, may seek compensation
from other states for cross-border harms under the law of state responsibility for internationally
wrongful acts. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Merits, 1949 I.C.J. Rep. 4, 22 (Apr. 9)
(affirming “every State’s obligation not to knowingly allow its territory to be used for acts contrary
to the rights of other States”); Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, at 370, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2(2)
Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 148, U.N. Doc. A/56/10.
12 See, e.g., Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in International
Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 837, 837 (2008) (“Despite decades of effort, the international
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International Criminal Court (ICC) provides that the “Court may make an
order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate reparations
to, or in respect of, victims.”13 While this marks the first time in the history
of international law that individual victims may seek remedies before an
international tribunal,14 the ICC appears unwilling to endorse employing
Article 75 to justify tort-like compensation.15 The U.S. Alien Tort Statute
(ATS) is unusual domestic legislation in that it recognizes and creates federal
subject matter jurisdiction for the prosecution of individuals for international
torts.16 Scholars have proposed augmenting the ATS to create enterprise or
group liability for international torts,17 but the possibility of tort liability in
international law (as opposed to U.S. jurisprudence) remains
underexplored.18

community has stumbled in attempts to craft tort remedies for victims of transboundary
environmental damage. More than a dozen civil liability treaties have been negotiated that create
causes of action and prescribe liability rules, but few have entered into force, and most remain
unadopted orphans in international environmental law.”).
13 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 75(2), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.
14 See David Donat-Cattin, Article 75: Reparations to Victims (noting that all prior regimes had
obligated only states to make reparations towards individual victims), in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 965, 966 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
15 The Trial Chamber issued its first decision discussing reparations in 2012, which the Appeals
Chamber amended in March 2015. Prosecutor v. Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Establishing the
Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1447971.pdf [https://perma.cc/K5BL-G7Z6], aff ’d, Judgment on the appeals
against Decision Establishing the Principles and Procedures to be Applied to Reparations (Mar. 3,
2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1919024.pdf [https://perma.cc/65TK-7ZF6]. Each
opinion provided only for collective remedies, suggesting that the ICC may be more interested in
using reparations to promote reconciliation than to provide compensation. See LUKE MOFFETT,
JUSTICE FOR VICTIMS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 158 (2014).
16 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”).
However, the international torts for which plaintiffs may sue are limited, see Sosa v. Alvarez-Marchain,
542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004), and the Supreme Court has recently held that this statute presumably does
not confer jurisdiction over torts that occurred outside the United States unless the claims “touch and
concern the territory of the United States” with “sufficient force,” Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Shell Petrol.,
133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Moreover, while the ATS provides federal subject
matter jurisdiction, plaintiffs suing under the ATS still must independently satisfy personal jurisdiction
requirements. See Daimler v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (dismissing suit under ATS for lack of
personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants).
17 See, e.g., Nilay Vora, Federal Common Law and Alien Tort Statute Litigation: Why Federal Common
Law Can (and Should) Provide Aiding and Abetting Liability, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 195 (2009).
18 See, e.g., Robert Alford, Apportioning Responsibility Among Joint Tortfeasors for International Law
Violations, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 1, 2010, 9:25 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2010/09/ 01/apportioning.cc/P9JKresponsibility-among-joint-tortfeasors-for-international-law-violations [https://perma
ZEXH] (discussing the lack of scholarship on the nexus between international law and domestic torts).
Maya Steinitz, however, has recently undertaken the challenge of arguing for the creation of a
permanent International Court of Civil Justice. See Maya Steinitz, The Case for an International Court of
Civil Justice, 67 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 75 (2014) (previewing a forthcoming book of the same title).
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While the reasons for the dearth of scholarship on international tort
liability are unclear, two facts are apparent. As evidenced by the varied and
extensive ATS litigation in the United States, there is a strong desire to hold
entities accountable for actions that fall short of incurring criminal liability.
And yet, given the relatively undeveloped nature of the legal structures, states
apparently have little interest in creating effective international tort liability
regimes. Considering the lack of international tort law, it is not surprising
that no one has yet evaluated whether it might be useful in addressing the
autonomous weapon systems accountability gap.19
However, this accountability gap is precisely the kind of problem tort law
is designed to solve.20 Pressures similar to those that fostered the
transformation of domestic tort law over a hundred years ago—the need to
create a liability regime for the “stranger cases” resulting from the Industrial
Revolution’s significant, unintended, machine-caused injuries—are at play
again, now in the international sphere.21 As opposed to criminal law, which
focuses on absolute prohibitions, tort law offers a means of regulating valuable
but inherently dangerous activities and compensating injurious wrongs.
As is often the case with new technology, autonomous weapon systems
expose a gap in the existing legal order. They highlight that, while there is an
established (if not necessarily practically effective) means of holding
individuals accountable for war crimes, the institutional processes of holding
states accountable for their “war torts” are relatively undeveloped. For a
variety of reasons, autonomous weapon systems provide an ideal test case for
the creation of a new liability regime for war torts; if such a regime proves to
be a useful counterpart to international criminal law, states might consider
the benefits of further expanding war torts liability.22
19 To the extent those writing on autonomous weapon systems ever discuss tort law, they focus
on practical obstacles to enforcement under domestic (usually American) tort law. See generally
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC AT HARVARD LAW SCH., MIND THE
GAP: THE LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR KILLER ROBOTS 26-36 (2015), https://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/arms0415_ForUpload_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ8R-V7FG] [hereinafter
MIND THE GAP]; Benjamin Kastan, Autonomous Weapons Systems: A Coming Legal “Singularity”?, 2013
J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 45.
20 Cf. Madeline Elish & Tim Hwang, Praise the Machine! Punish the Human! The Contradictory
History of Accountability in Automated Aviation (Data & Soc’y Research Inst., Working Paper No. 1,
2015), http://www.datasociety.net/pubs/ia/Elish-Hwang_Accountability AutomatedAviation.pdf
[https://perma.cc/987C-TPSQ] (discussing how accidents caused by highly automated technologies
were integrated relatively seamlessly into existing product liability and tort law regimes).
21 See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 300 (2d ed. 1985);
G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 16 (1980).
22 Michael Reisman proposed a general obligation for states to compensate for unintended
injuries to civilians nearly twenty years ago, regardless of whether or not there was a violation of the
law of war. See W. Michael Reisman, The Lessons of Qana, 22 YALE J. INT’L L. 381, 397 (1997); see also
Yael Ronen, Avoid or Compensate? Liability for Incidental Injury to Civilians Inflicted During Armed
Conflict, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 181 (2009) (arguing that states should be held strictly liable
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Part I reviews the rise of individual criminal responsibility and discusses
how it has largely obscured the role of the law of state responsibility for
serious violations of international humanitarian law. Part II describes how,
because of their propensity for unpredictable action, autonomous weapon
systems undermine a foundational principle of international criminal law:
that serious violations of international humanitarian law will not occur
without an individual acting intentionally or recklessly. Part III proposes that
how “war torts”—serious violations of international humanitarian law that
give rise to state responsibility—are necessary to balance and complement
“war crimes” and considers how autonomous weapon systems may provide an
ideal test case for a war torts liability regime.
I. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN ARMED CONFLICT
A “war crime” is commonly understood as any serious violation of
international humanitarian law, in either an international or noninternational armed conflict.23 This definition encompasses violations of jus
ad bellum rules,24 such as the initiation of an aggressive war; violations of
customary jus in bello rules,25 which might include intentionally targeting
civilians or using weapons indiscriminately; or violations of specific treaty
obligations or prohibitions, like mistreating prisoners of war or using
chemical weapons.26
The legal perpetrators and legal victims of the earliest “war crimes” were
states, not individuals.27 While there are some notable exceptions—the 1305
English trial of Scottish hero Sir William Wallace (of Braveheart fame) for waging
indiscriminate war and the 1474 Austrian trial of Peter von Hagenbach for
for injuries incurred by civilians in armed conflict). Autonomous weapon systems may create the
opportunity and incentive for states to put this idea into practice. See infra Section III.B.
23 ICRC Rule 156, supra note 8 (defining “war crimes” as “[g]rave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions”); Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 8(2)(b) & (c) (defining war crimes as “[o]ther
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict,” and “[o]ther
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international
character”). The International Committee of the Red Cross observes that violations of the law of
war tend to be considered serious, and therefore war crimes, “if they endanger protected persons or
objects or if they breach important values.” See ICRC Rule 156, supra note 8 (providing examples).
24 Jus ad bellum is the law governing the commencement of hostilities.
25 Jus in bello is the law governing the conduct of hostilities.
26 War crimes often coexist with crimes against humanity, which tend to be widespread or
systematic practices that target civilian populations and might include massacres, human
experimentation, or slavery. Cf. Greppi, supra note 10, at 549 (“If war crimes and crimes against
humanity are now two autonomous, self-sustained categories, it cannot be denied that they are often
closely linked in modern conflicts, especially in connection with crimes against the civilian
population.”). Crimes against the peace, in contrast, tend to be associated with instigating wars of
aggression in contravention of the U.N. Charter. U.N. Charter art 2, ¶4; see also id. arts. 33, 39, 51.
27 BETH VAN SCHAACK & RON C. SLYE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 18-19 (2009).
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atrocities committed by troops under his command—by and large individuals
were not considered criminally liable under international law. Instead,
responsible states were liable to other states for reparations and other tort-like
remedies.
For the past seventy years, however, international criminal law promoters
have been working to create enforceable individual liability for war crimes.
They have been successful insofar as the concept of “war crimes” is now
intertwined with individual criminal liability: indeed, many now include the
requirement of individual liability in their definition of war crime.28
Meanwhile, at least with regard to serious violations of international
humanitarian law, the relevance of state responsibility has been largely
obscured.
A. State Responsibility in Armed Conflicts
International law originally developed to clarify the rights and obligations
of states with regard to other states. The law of state responsibility is one of
international law’s core legal regimes, on par with the law of treaties or the
sources of international legal obligations.29
A state responsible for a violation of a legal obligation must “make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”30
regardless of the source of the legal obligation, the entity to which it is owed,
or the nature or seriousness of the resulting harm. International obligations
encompass both treaty and nontreaty obligations: violations of bilateral
agreements may seem similar to breaches of contract, while violations of
customary or constitutive treaty obligations are more akin to torts or crimes.31
Tthe law of state responsibility does not distinguish between potential
wronged parties: A state may now owe an international legal obligation to
See supra note 8.
After roughly fifty years of work, in 2001 the International Law Commission published draft
articles on the law of state responsibility, and commentaries to these articles. G.A. Res. 56/83, annex,
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (Jan. 28, 2002) [hereinafter Draft
Articles]; Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2)
[hereinafter Draft Articles Commentaries]. At present, there is no impetus to formalize these
articles in a treaty, but they are regularly cited and relied upon by states, tribunals, and civil society
as describing the relevant customary rules.
30 Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 31(1); see also Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Claim for
Indemnity, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13) (“[I]t is a principle of international law, and
even a general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an obligation to make
reparation.”). An “internationally wrongful act” is “an action or omission” that is both “attributable
to the State under international law” and “constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the
State.” Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 2.
31 Id. at 55.
28
29
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individuals, another state, or the international community as a whole. Finally,
there is no distinction “between ‘civil’ and ‘criminal’ responsibility as is the
case in internal legal systems.”32
States incur numerous positive and negative international humanitarian
law obligations, both in peacetime and while engaging in armed conflict.33 In
the absence of an authoritative law enforcer, states are charged with enforcing
these obligations: states must prevent, prosecute, and punish violations
committed by their nationals or occurring on their territory, and states may
even have some duties to ensure that other states comply with the Geneva
Conventions.
To minimize international humanitarian law violations, states must
conduct legal reviews of new weaponry to ensure all fielded weapons are
capable of being lawfully used. The obligation to conduct legal reviews,
binding on all states under customary law,34 has also been codified in
Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions.35 States must also
train members of their armed forces in international humanitarian law and
disseminate the 1949 Geneva Conventions “as widely as possible.”36
32 See id. at 111 (“[T]he present articles do not recognize the existence of any distinction
between State ‘crimes’ and ‘delicts.’”).
33 Common Article 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions states, “The High Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter
Second Geneva Convention]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War
art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]; see also INT’L COMMITTEE
RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/home [https://perma.cc/Q8GU-T2SM] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (describing various
specific rules).
34 Customary international law prohibits the use of weapons that are by nature indiscriminate
or those that cause superfluous injury and suffering. As a result, it can be presumed that states are
required to conduct reviews to avoid fielding unlawful weapons. See Kathleen Lewand et al., A Guide
to the Legal Review of New Weapons, Means and Methods of Warfare: Measures to Implement Article 36 of
Additional Protocol I of 1977, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931, 933 (2006) [hereinafter ICRC Guide to
Legal Review] (“The faithful and responsible application of its international law obligations would
require a State to ensure that the new weapons, means and methods of warfare it develops or acquires
will not violate these obligations.”).
35 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 36, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First Additional Protocol].
36 First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 47; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art.
48; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 127; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art.
144. The obligation to disseminate is reiterated in the two 1977 Additional Protocols. First Additional
Protocol, supra note 35, art. 83; Protocol Additional (II) to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
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Additionally, states have a duty to investigate and, if appropriate, prosecute
war crimes allegedly committed by their nationals, by their armed forces, or
by anyone in their territory or anywhere else over which they exercise
jurisdiction. The Geneva Conventions require state parties to search for
individuals alleged to have committed grave breaches and either try or
extradite them,37 and similar obligations are found in a number of other
international humanitarian law treaties.38 In keeping with these international
obligations, many states provide for the investigation and prosecution of war
crimes through national legislation.39 For these and other reasons, the
International Committee of the Red Cross has recognized states’ duty to
prosecute war crimes as customary international law.40
It has long been established in treaty law and international customary law
that states are responsible for war crimes committed by members of their
armed forces, and this legal requirement has been repeatedly upheld in case
law.41 States party to Additional Protocol I are also responsible for their
agents’ actions committed in excess of their delegated authority or contrary
to instructions.42 In certain circumstances, states may also be responsible for
war crimes committed by nonstate actors. This includes actions of individuals
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 19, June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 609; see also Rule 142. Instruction in International Humanitarian Law within Armed Forces,
INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE,
https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule142 [https://perma.cc/T579-V9TT] (last
visited Apr. 15, 2016) (“States and parties to the conflict must provide instruction in international
humanitarian law to their armed forces.”).
37 First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 33,
art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
33, art. 146. The ICRC claims that this is a customary law obligation, as the obligation to investigate
and punish war crimes is mentioned in numerous military manuals, national legislation, and official
statements. See Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY
INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_rul_rule158
[https://perma.cc/EMJ5-CJBJ] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
38 See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use
of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. VII(1), Jan. 13, 1993, S. Treaty Doc. No. 103-21,
1974 U.N.T.S. 317 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention]; Rome Statute, supra note 13, pmbl.
39 See, e.g., War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (2012).
40 Rule 158. Prosecution of War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L
HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter44_
rule158 [https://perma.cc/V389-H745] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
41 See Rule 149. Responsibility for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, INT’L
COMMITTEE RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter42_rule149 [https://perma.cc/2P3B-7VEP] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016)
[hereinafter ICRC Rule 149] (citing sources).
42 See First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 91 (“A Party . . . shall be responsible for all
acts committed by persons forming part of its armed forces.”); see also Draft Articles Commentaries,
supra note 29, at 46. The United States, which is not party to the First Additional Protocol, maintains
that a state is not responsible for “private” acts of its armed forces under customary law, unless it
can be shown that there was inadequate supervision or training. See ICRC Rule 149, supra note 41.
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or entities empowered to exercise governmental authority, actions of
individuals or entities who act under a state’s direction or control, and actions
of private individuals or entities which the state acknowledges and adopts as
its own.43
Despite being a foundational concept in international law, state
responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law is at
risk of being eclipsed by the rise of individual criminal liability.
B. The Rise of Individual Criminal Liability
Notwithstanding the ongoing existence of state responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law, the past seventy years have
witnessed the dramatic rise of individual liability for war crimes. This once
nonexistent legal concept is now “the unchallenged cornerstone of the entire
edifice of international criminal law.”44
1. Historic Foundations
Despite the adage about love and war, there is a longstanding desire to
hold individuals accountable for their actions in armed conflicts. As early as
1386, domestic laws limited what individual actions were permissible.45 U.S.
Secretary of War William Marcy and U.S. Major General Winfield Scott
built “a general principle of individual criminal liability for violations of the
law of war” in late 1847.46 The 1863 Lieber Code—one of the first and most
internationally influential codifications of the law of war—prohibited various
activities, including “wanton violence committed against persons in the
invaded country, all destruction of property . . . , all robbery, all pillage or
sacking [and] all rape, wounding, maiming or killing of such inhabitants.”47
The first treaty codification of individual criminal liability can be found
in the work of 1874 Brussels Conference on the Rules of Military Warfare.
Attended by fifteen countries, this Conference produced a Draft
International Convention on the Laws and Customs of War, section III of
which provided:
43 Draft Articles, supra note 29, arts. 5, 8, 11.
44 Christian Tomuschat, The Legacy of Nuremberg, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 830, 840 (2006).
45 Greppi, supra note 10, at 531 (discussing limitations in English, Hungarian, and Swedish laws).
46 JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 130 (2012).
47 FRANCIS LIEBER, U.S. WAR DEP’T, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES
OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE FIELD art. 44 (1898) [hereinafter LIEBER CODE]; see also id. art. 47

(endorsing punishment for crimes “punishable by all penal codes,” such as arson, murder, assault, and
rape, “if committed by an American soldier in a hostile country against its inhabitants”). These
humanitarian rules, however, were often swallowed by the military necessity exception, see id. arts.
14-16, 38, which has been characterized as “[t]he master principle that animated the code” and “a robust
license to destroy.” WITT, supra note 46, at 234.
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The laws and customs of war forbid not only unnecessary cruelty and acts of
barbarism committed against the enemy; they demand also, on the part of
the appropriate authorities, the immediate punishment of these persons who
are guilty of these acts, if they were not caused by absolute necessity.48

The 1919 Versailles Peace Treaty similarly attempted to establish
individual criminal responsibility.49 Articles 227 and 228 asserted the Allied
and Associated Powers’ right to establish military tribunals to try and punish
the former German Emperor and other “persons accused of having
committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war.”50 However, by
the time the Versailles Treaty entered into force, the Kaiser had relocated to
the Netherlands, which refused to extradite him for trial.51 Nor were the
Allies successful in prosecuting other individuals under Article 228.52
As it marked the first time individuals were held liable for violating
international humanitarian law, Nuremberg is commonly regarded as the
fount of individual criminal responsibility. The Charter of the International
Military Tribunal at Nuremberg explicitly recognized individual criminal
liability for crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.53
The Nuremberg trials created an important judicial precedent of holding
individuals accountable for actions in violation of international humanitarian
law, and shortly thereafter the U.N. General Assembly recognized the
“Nuremberg Principles” as preexisting customary international law deserving
of formal codification.54 The first of these Principles, codified in 1950 by the
International Law Commission, states that “any person who commits an act
which constitutes a crime under international law is responsible therefor and
liable to punishment.”55

48 ACTES DE LA CONFÉRENCE DE BRUXELLES DE 1874: SUR LE PROJET D’UNE
CONVENTION INTERNATIONALE CONCERNANT LA GUERRE: PROTOCOLES DES SCÉANCES
PLÉNIÈRES, PROTOCOLES DE LA COMMISSION DÉLEGUÉE PAR LA CONFÉRENCE, ANNEXES 4

(Paris, Librairie des publications législatives 1874). This Draft Convention was signed by fifteen
states, but it was never ratified.
49 See Simeon E. Baldwin, The Proposed Trial of the Former Kaiser, 29 YALE L.J. 75 (1919)
(discussing the novelty of individual liability in international law).
50 Treaty of Peace with Germany (Treaty of Versailles) arts. 227-28, June 28, 1919, 225 Parry’s
T.S. 189 [hereinafter Versailles Peace Treaty].
51 VAN SCHAACK & SLYE, supra note 27, at 24.
52 Id. at 24-25.
53 Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1546, 82 U.N.T.S. 284.
54 G.A. Res. 95 (I), Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal (Dec. 11, 1946).
55 Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nürnberg Tribunal and in
the Judgment of the Tribunal, Int’l L. Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Second Session, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/L.2 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 2 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 181, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22.
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Since Nuremberg, states and international organizations have codified
specific war crimes and created obligations for domestic enforcement,56 tried
individuals in domestic courts,57 and established a variety of international and
hybrid criminal tribunals.58 These efforts culminated with the Rome Statute
establishing the ICC, which entered into force on July 1, 2002.59 Unlike other
tribunals, which are temporary institutions with retrospective jurisdiction,60
the ICC is a permanent court with prospective jurisdiction.61 The ICC is
meant to operate in conjunction with national courts: it can exercise
jurisdiction only if states are unwilling or unable to carry out criminal
proceedings against alleged perpetrators.62
For roughly seventy years, international criminal law has been developing
a theory of individual liability for war crimes and creating law, institutions,
and enforcement mechanisms to give this theory teeth. While these
enforcement mechanisms are far from perfect—the ICC in particular is often
the subject of mockery and complaint—they are significantly more robust
than at any other time in human history.
2. The Performative Function of Criminal Law
In 1865, during the American Civil War, Confederate Captain Henry
Wirz was accused of mistreating and killing Union prisoners of war in
violation of the laws and customs of war.63 In his defense, Wirz maintained
that he was simply working with what he had:
I do not think that I ought to be held responsible for the shortness of rations,
for the overcrowded state of the prison, (which was of itself a prolific source
of fearful mortality), for the inadequate supply of clothing, want of shelter,

56 See, e.g., First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 46 (obligating parties to “ensure the
detailed execution of ” this Geneva Convention); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (mandating that parties
to the treaty to “undertake to enact” domestic legislation effectuating the Genocide Convention).
57 See, e.g., CA 40/61 Att’y Gen. of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann 16 PD 2033 (1962) (Isr.)
(prosecuting a Nazi war criminal in Israeli domestic courts).
58 These include the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (est. 1993), the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (est. 1994), and the hybrid courts in East Timor (est.
2002), Sierra Leone (est. 2002), and Cambodia (est. 2003).
59 Rome Statute, supra note 13.
60 For example, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was established
to prosecute atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia after 1991. S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
61 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 17.
62 Id.
63 JOHN MCELROY, ANDERSONVILLE: A STORY OF REBEL MILITARY PRISONS, FIFTEEN
MONTHS A GUEST OF THE SO-CALLED SOUTHERN CONFEDERACY; A PRIVATE SOLDIER’S
EXPERIENCE IN RICHMOND, ANDERSONVILLE, SAVANNAH, MILLEN, BLACKSHEAR AND
FLORENCE 639-44 (1879).
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etc., etc . . . . [I] was only the medium, or, I may better say, the tool in the
hands of my superiors.64

After his conviction, Captain Wirz was sentenced to death by hanging.65
Standing on the gallows, he allegedly remarked to the officer in charge, “I
know what orders are, Major. I am being hanged for obeying them.”66
Why create individual criminal liability for serious violations of
international humanitarian law, especially for persons acting on behalf of a
state or armed group? Often, members of a military are only following their
superiors’ orders—indeed, in some cases subordinates can be severely (even
fatally) punished by their superiors should they disobey. As evidenced by
Captain Wirz’s experience, the creation of individual criminal liability for
certain violations of international humanitarian law often results in soldiers
being caught between a rock and a hard place: they are damned under
international law if they do follow orders and participate in the commission
of illegal acts, and they are damned by their superiors if they don’t.
One possible reason for the recent rise of international criminal law is that
it serves a performative function that other forms of liability do not. Tort and
criminal law were originally understood to be two branches of the single legal
subject of wrongs, and both aim to reinforce social norms and to deter future
unlawful activity through sanctions.67 But whereas tort law is also concerned
with compensating individual victims, criminal law is more focused with
retribution and expressive justice.68 Many agree with Blackstone that crimes
demand punishment, whereas torts usually require only recompense, in part
because crimes “strike at the very being of society; which cannot possibly
subsist, where actions of this sort are suffered to escape with impunity.”69
64 Letter from Henry Wirz, Captain, Confederate Army, to James H. Wilson, Major General,
Union Army (May 7, 1865), reproduced in MCELROY, supra note 63, at 639, 640.
65 MCELROY, supra note 63, at 644.
66 PAUL J. SPRINGER & GLENN ROBINS, TRANSFORMING CIVIL WAR PRISONS: LINCOLN,
LIEBER, AND THE POLITICS OF CAPTIVITY 80 (2014).
67 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, OR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE
LAW 517 (Robert Campbell ed., 3d ed. 1869) (“All wrongs [are] in their remote consequences generally
mischievous . . . .”).
68 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194 (1991) (“Far more than tort law, the
criminal law is a system for public communication of values.”); Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort
Distinction: Legal Doctrine and Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 719-25 (2008) (discussing
structural and normative distinctions between criminal and tort law); id. at 721 (“[N]ormally,
compensation is the remedy, whatever the nature of the tort or wrong.”); cf. Guido Calabresi & A.
Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124-27 (1972) (discussing, in the context of rape and thievery, how criminal
sanctions are used to prevent the conversion of property rules into liability rules).
69 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. But see AUSTIN, supra note 67, at 196 (“All
offences affect the community, and all offences affect individuals.”).
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The need for expressive, post hoc justice is particularly acute in the
context of international humanitarian law, especially as the possibility of
enforcement through reciprocity and reprisals has diminished.70 As has been
observed in a variety of ways, war is hell.71 And yet, even in war, there is a
sense that certain things are not done, that certain lines cannot be crossed.72
Historically, states enforced these norms through reciprocity and reprisals.
Reciprocity is the idea that one side need comply with the laws of war only if
the other side does; reprisals are proportional and responsive violations of the
law of war intended to force the other party to a conflict to resume compliance
with international law.73 For example, if state A tortures prisoners of war
(POWs), state B could respond in kind, both in reciprocity and as a reprisal.
The Lieber Code acknowledged the importance of reciprocal action: “The
law of war can no more wholly dispense with retaliation than can the law of
nations, of which it is a branch.”74 Similarly, early law of war treaties often
explicitly conditioned their requirements on reciprocal observance.75
Today, however, reprisal against innocents, civilians, noncombatants, and
wounded or captured soldiers has been outlawed,76 and modern international
humanitarian law treaties have largely dispensed with the reciprocity
requirement (and for good reason!).77 Like human rights treaties, they now
obligate state parties’ compliance without regard to how other states act78: If
state A tortures POWs, state B is not free to do so.
70 This account implies that international criminal liability arose to fill a gap left by the decline
of reciprocity as a means of enforcement and deterrence; others have suggested that burgeoning
international criminal law actually displaced reciprocity and now undermines it. See Kenneth
Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law: Intended and Unintended Consequences, 20 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 331, 340-43 (2009) [hereinafter Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law].
71 See, e.g., E. E. CUMMINGS, plato told, in SELECTED POEMS BY E. E. CUMMINGS 145, 145
(Richard S. Kennedy ed. 1944).
72 Granted, those lines were often drawn in ways that now seem quite disturbing. See, e.g.,
JEAN-JACQUES FRÉSARD, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, THE ROOTS OF BEHAVIOUR IN
WAR: A SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 22 (2004), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/
icrc_002_0854.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XP6-HWVS] (“Religions themselves are the first to specify,
more or less explicitly, that the injunction [not to kill] concerns above all our people. The others, the
‘unbelievers,’ infidels and apostates, may be run through by the swords of men when they are not
simply delivered up to the sword of God.”).
73 See Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 340-43 (discussing different
theories of reciprocity); Sean Watts, Reciprocity and the Law of War, 50 HARV. INT’L L.J. 365, 382-86
(2009) (comparing and contrasting reciprocity and reprisals).
74 LIEBER CODE, supra note 47, art. 27; see also id. arts. 61-62 (emphasizing the propriety of
reciprocation in the context of quartering troops).
75 Watts, supra note 73, at 367.
76 Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 340.
77 But see Watts, supra note 73, at 417-30 (arguing that, although the principle of reciprocity has
softened and altered, it is still fundamental to the operation of international humanitarian law).
78 Cf. Lea Brilmayer, From ‘Contract’ to ‘Pledge’: The Structure of International Human Rights
Agreements, 77 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 163 (2006).
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Reciprocity and reprisals were effective, if draconian, deterrent and
enforcement mechanisms.79 In the wake of their decline, there is a greater
need to entrench norms of conduct in armed conflict and to create
disincentives to violate them. Criminal law is well suited to this task: unlike
tort liability, which sometimes seems to merely ascribe a price to or “license”
certain actions, criminal law has a morally expressive element. Crimes can be
justly punished because they are blameworthy actions; torts and breaches of
contract are (relatively) morally neutral.
In addition to providing an incentive to adhere to the norms of armed
conflict, punishment of war criminals also restores dignity to victims.
Violations of individual rights “conveys a message that the victim’s rights are
not sufficiently important to refrain from violating them in pursuit of another
goal,”80 and punishment of a violation rights the scales by “send[ing] the
message that the lives and rights of victims have value.”81 Developing
accountability mechanisms and providing remedies to victims motivated the
U.N. General Assembly to adopt the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the
Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law.82
The creation of criminal liability for war crimes implied the development
of international individual criminal liability.83 As Michael Walzer famously
observed, “If there are recognizable war crimes, there must be recognizable
criminals.”84 While a state may be responsible for war crimes, it cannot stand
as a criminal defendant.85 A state does not have the mens rea required for
See, e.g., Watts, supra note 73.
DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 21 (3d ed. 2015).
MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 14.
G.A. Res. 60/147, pmbl. (Mar. 21, 2006) [hereinafter Basic Principles].
In domestic law, entities like corporations may be held criminally liable. See V.S. Khanna,
Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477 (1996) (noting the
rise in corporate criminal liability in the 1980s and 1990s). This poses a theoretical puzzle: How is
it possible to determine the mens rea of a corporation? Different justifications have been floated,
but many question whether it is ever appropriate to hold a corporation criminally liable. See, e.g., id.
at 1532-34 (concluding that a modified form of corporate civil liability would be practically and
normatively preferable to corporate criminal liability).
84 WALZER, supra note 1, at 287.
85 Certain members of the International Law Commission attempted, and failed, to establish
“state crimes”—crimes for which the state would be the direct subject of criminal liability. This
concept was eventually abandoned. Rebecca J. Hamilton, State-Enabled Crimes, 41 YALE J. INT’L L.
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract _id=2647425
[https://perma.cc/SL4Z-XMC8]. But see NINA H. B. JØRGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF
STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 208-33 (2000) (arguing that the concept of “state crimes”
has never fully disappeared). See generally INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE ILC’S DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY (Joseph H. H. Weiler,
Antonio Cassese & Marina Spinedi eds., 1989) (providing an overview of the state crimes debate).
79
80
81
82
83
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criminal liability, nor can it be punished with traditional criminal sanctions,
like imprisonment or capital punishment. The Confederate States of America
could not be hung for failure to comply with international humanitarian law;
Captain Wirz could.86
C. The Unnecessary Displacement of State Responsibility
Ever since Nuremberg, and with the aim of eliminating (or at least
stigmatizing and minimizing) war crimes, international criminal law
proponents have been working to create and strengthen an international legal
regime that holds individuals accountable for war crimes they commit or
could have prevented. While the development of international criminal law
is laudable, the tendency of some to treat individual criminal accountability
as the sole remedy to violations of international humanitarian law is a
mistake.87 Although certain war crimes may be committed by individuals,
wars “are fought between political communities and by groups.”88 Focusing
on individual criminal liability tends to obscure the fact that states remain
legally responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law.89
The law of state responsibility is rarely discussed or enforced with regard
to serious violations of international humanitarian law, even though most
such violations would be more appropriately attributed to the state than to
individuals.90 This is hardly accidental: rather, “[t]he history of the Draft
86 See Draft Articles Commentaries, supra note 29, at 111 (noting the obsolescence of the
concept of “international crimes of state”). But see JØRGENSEN, supra note 85, at 167-207 (arguing
that states should be held criminally responsible under a criminal organization model or a corporate
crime model and sanctioned with declaratory judgments and punitive damages).
87 See Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 346 (“[T]he attention
focused by international criminal law on individual criminal liability has the unintended
consequence of reducing attention to the rest of the laws of war—the corpus of the laws of war not
devoted to liability at all, let alone criminal liability for individuals.”).
88 Id. at 346.
89 See, e.g., JØRGENSEN, supra note 85, at 27 (“[I]ndividual criminal responsibility under
international law for acts of state became well established while state criminal responsibility,
although a key issue, was increasingly viewed as an unworkable concept, and consequently took a
back seat.”); Laurel E. Fletcher, A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing: Transitional Justice and the Effacement of
State Accountability for International Crimes, 39 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 447, 447 (2016) (observing that
“[t]he rise of international criminal law is celebrated as an achievement of the international rule of
law, yet its advance effectively may come at the expense of holding States accountable for their role
in mass violence”); Hamilton, supra note 85 (arguing that international criminal law inappropriately
bifurcates state and individual responsibility for war crimes); André Nollkaemper, Introduction to
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 5 (Harmen van der Wilt & André Nollkaemper
eds., 2009) (discussing how “[t]he emphasis on individual responsibility obscures a basic truth about
war crimes,” namely, that they are often fostered by the controlling collective entity).
90 See Anderson, Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 347 (“The whole body of
law [of war] covers many matters which are not, on their surface, very usefully made a matter of
individual criminal liability.”).
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Articles [of State Responsibility] illustrates how States jealously policed the
boundaries of international criminal accountability. They curtailed
acknowledgement that States may commit acts categorized as international
crimes with the formal legal opprobrium that comes with criminal
responsibility.”91 This differing level of commitment to ensuring
accountability for individuals and states is reflected by the differing
institutional enforcement mechanisms:
While [international criminal law] is salient in the public imagination, with
a list of shiny new institutions that have facilitated its rise to prominence, the
law of State responsibility has been developing with comparatively little
fanfare. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) and regional human rights
courts have jurisdiction over the law of State responsibility for international
crimes. But these mechanisms face significant limitations, both legal and
political, when it comes to the adjudication of the State’s role . . . .92

There is no need for international criminal law to eclipse the law of state
responsibility. Not only can the two legal regimes symbiotically coexist,93 but
a better understanding of their respective strengths would allow them to
augment and support each other. Consider Captain Wirz’s trial for POW
camp conditions. If he had truly been doing the best with what he had, it was
unjust to brand him a war criminal—doing so actually detracts from the moral
legitimacy of international criminal law. Instead, the Confederate States
should have been held responsible and required to make reparations. If,
however, Captain Wirz took a sadistic glee in torturing and killing Union
prisoners, it was appropriate to hold him personally responsible for war
crimes. Nor are these two possibilities mutually exclusive: Captain Wirz
could be charged and punished for his war crimes, and the Confederate States
could be held responsible both for camp conditions and to the extent the
States enabled his crimes.94
*

91

*

*

Fletcher, supra note 89, at 475.
Hamilton, supra note 85, at 17; see also Fletcher, supra note 89, at 460 (“[W]e have a fully
articulated system of international criminal law, while there is no parallel system to enforce State
responsibility for the same violations.”).
93 In the Geneva Conventions, state responsibility is recognized as existing in conjunction
with individual criminal responsibility. See First Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 51; Second
Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 52; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 131; Fourth
Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 148.
94 Cf. Hamilton, supra note 85 (arguing for the recognition of “state-enabled crimes”—crimes
that could not have occurred without the state playing an integral role).
92

1366

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1347

The rise of individual criminal responsibility has had the unfortunate side
effect of eclipsing the role of the law of state responsibility for serious
violations of international humanitarian law. Institutions for holding
individuals accountable for war crimes have flowered, while institutional
approaches to holding states accountable for their internationally wrongful
acts in armed conflicts have stagnated. Although some have expressed
concern at this apparent tradeoff,95 up until now it has not been obviously
problematic. Because they may take unpredictable action, however,
autonomous weapon systems break the causal chain necessary for individual
criminal liability and thereby highlight the relative lack of institutional means
of holding states responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law.
II. THE ACCOUNTABILITY GAP
Science fiction writers have long hypothesized that autonomous weapon
systems may destroy human values, human independence, or even all of
humanity—for the purposes of this Article, I am merely concerned with the
threat they pose to international criminal law. Autonomous weapon systems
challenge a presumption that undergirds all of international criminal law: that
serious violations of international humanitarian law will not occur absent
willful human action. In situations where no one acts intentionally or
recklessly, under current law no one—not the deployer, commander,
programmer, developer, manufacturer, or the weapon system itself—can (or
should) be held criminally liable for the deadly consequences of an
autonomous weapon systems’ unanticipated actions.
A. Introducing Autonomous Weapon Systems
Autonomous weapon systems “have been described as the third revolution
in warfare, after gunpowder and nuclear arms.”96 A former U.S. Major
General states that “[f]ull lethal autonomy is no mere next step in military
strategy: It will be the crossing of a moral Rubicon.”97 The conglomerate
nongovernmental organization Campaign to Stop Killer Robots was formed

See, e.g., id.
Stuart Russell, Take a Stand on AI Weapons, 521 NATURE 415, 415 (2015).
Robert H. Latiff & Patrick J. McCloskey, With Drone Warfare, America Approaches the RoboRubicon, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 2013, 7:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788
7324128504578346333246145590 [https://perma.cc/C67E-SKNP].
95
96
97
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recently for the sole purpose of promoting a ban on such weaponry.98 But
what are autonomous weapon systems, and what makes them so terrifying?
1. The Killer Robots Are Here
An “autonomous weapon system” is “a weapon system that, based on
conclusions derived from gathered information and preprogrammed
constraints, is capable of independently selecting and engaging targets.”99
Unlike the semi-autonomous drones in use today, which may have some
autonomous functions but are essentially remotely piloted bombers,
autonomous weapon systems can operate without a human “in” or “on” the
loop.100 Autonomous weapon systems should also be distinguished from
automated weapons, like rudimentary landmines or trip-wire sentry guns. In
contrast to these purely reactive systems, autonomous weapon systems gather
and process data from their environment to reach independent conclusions
about how to act.101
Autonomous weapon systems are far from fictional or futuristic: several
countries are already fielding weapon systems with varying levels of
autonomy and lethality.102 For example, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis control system,
operated in conjunction with U.S. Phalanx Close In Weapons Systems
(CIWS), provides a last-ditch defense against anti-ship missiles and
aircraft.103 Aegis has four modes, the last of which presumes that all human
operators are incapacitated and independently identifies and engages
incoming threats.104 The navies of at least thirty states are currently using
Aegis/CIWS and similar systems.105 The South Korean SGR-A1 is a
stationary, armed robot used to monitor the demilitarized zone. Allegedly, it
has an operating mode under which it can select and engage targets with no

98 See About Us, CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, https://www.stopkillerrobots.
org/about-us/ [https://perma.cc/CNJ8-ZRX3] (last visited Apr. 16, 2016) (“[L]aunched in London
in April 2013, the Campaign . . . work[s] to preemptively ban fully autonomous weapons.”).
99 Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1842.
100 See id. at 1855-63 (distinguishing between autonomous and semi-autonomous weapon systems).
101 See id. at 1855-56 (distinguishing between autonomous and automated weapon systems and
discussing the difficulty and usefulness of drawing a line in the sand between them).
102 See, e.g., id. at 1868-72 (describing existing autonomous weapon systems).
103 John Pike, MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS), FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS,
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mk-15.htm [https://perma.cc/QW9Y-MXMV] (last
updated Jan. 9, 2003).
104 See Marchant et al., supra note 6, at 287 (describing this “casualty” setting of the Aegis,
according to which the system “does what it thinks is necessary to save the ship”).
105 Paul Scharre & Michael C. Horowitz, An Introduction to Autonomy in Weapon Systems
12 (Feb. 13, 2015) (unpublished working paper), http://www.cnas.org/sites/default/files/publicationspdf/Ethical%20Autonomy%20Working%20Paper_021015_v02.pdf [https://perma.cc/P422-K2XW].
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human oversight (although it does not appear to be used in that mode).106
The Israeli Harpy Loitering Weapon is an airborne weapon designed to
identify and destroy enemy radar emitters.107 Unlike most fire-and-forget
missiles, “[t]he person launching the Harpy does not known [sic] which
particular radars are to be engaged, only that radars that meet the Harpy’s
programmed parameters will be engaged.”108 Instead, it independently selects
and attempts to destroy targets. Russia and China are both employing PMK-2
encapsulated torpedo mines, “a type of sea mine that, when activated by a
passing ship, instead of exploding, open [sic] a capsule which then releases a
torpedo that engages a target.”109 For practical and strategic reasons, the vast
majority of autonomous weapon systems in use today are being employed
with human supervision, but they are nonetheless capable of independently
selecting and engaging targets.110
Both advocates and critics of a ban on autonomous weapon systems often
assume that such weaponry does not yet exist.111 If these writers are discussing
what they term “fully” autonomous weapon systems—usually defined as
weapon systems with human-level cognitive capabilities or ones that are not
capable of being controlled by a human operator—their assessment is correct.
Artificial intelligence has not advanced to the point that robots have humanlevel cognition, and militaries have not fielded weapons that are incapable of
being controlled (nor are they ever likely to do so). But while these distinctions
are important in designing regulations, they are irrelevant to the question of
whether a weapon system is autonomous. If a weapon has the capability to

106 Samsung Techwin SGR-A1 Sentry Guard Robot, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, http://www.
globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/sgr-a1.htm [https://perma.cc/9PJ8-D885] (last updated Nov. 7, 2011).
107 Harpy Loitering Weapon, ISR. AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES, www.iai.co.il/2013/36663-45984EN/Groups.aspx [https://perma.cc/YK3G-YB5B] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016).
108 Paul Scharre, Autonomy, “Killer Robots,” and Human Control in the Use of Force—Part I, JUST
SECURITY (July 9, 2014, 11:17 AM), http://justsecurity.org/12708/autonomy-killer-robots-humancontrol-force-part [https://perma.cc/EE2E-J57B].
109 Id.
110 See Werner J.A. Dahm, Killer Drones Are Science Fiction, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 15, 2012), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204883304577221590015475180 [https://perma.cc/3X2P-XG
ZQ] (“[I]t’s not technology that has held us back from fully autonomous military strikes—from a purely
technical perspective, it has been possible for some time to conduct them.”).
111 See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC, HARVARD LAW
SCH., LOSING HUMANITY: THE CASE AGAINST KILLER ROBOTS 46 (2012), http://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/reports/arms1112ForUpload_0_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/YUQ8-WKYH] (“Although
fully autonomous weapons do not exist yet, technology is rapidly moving in that direction.”);
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems and the Law
of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 231, 234 (2013) (“[A]n outright ban is premature since
no such weapons have even left the drawing board.”).
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independently select and engage targets, whether it does so is a question of how
it is used, not whether autonomous weapon systems exist.112
2. . . . And More Are Coming
Classically, militaries have had little use for unpredictable weapons or
ones that could not be controlled,113 doomsday device arguments
notwithstanding.114 In fact, many attribute the success of bans on chemical
and biological weapons to their indiscriminate nature—not because
indiscriminate weapons are unlawful, but rather because they endanger one’s
own troops and therefore are a less preferable option.115 Similarly, some have
argued that military codes, rules of engagement, and even international
humanitarian law developed as commanders attempted to better control the
most autonomous of weapons—human beings.116 Because of the military’s
interest in foreseeable results, one may credibly suggest that states will have
little incentive to develop, let alone deploy, potentially unpredictable
autonomous weapon systems.117 For example, the South Korean Super aEgis
II, a gun-toting stationary robot, was originally designed to fire
112 See Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1861-62 (distinguishing between autonomous
capability and autonomous use).
113 Indiscriminate weapons are those which cannot be directed at a military objective or those
whose effects cannot be controlled. There is a customary international law prohibition on the fielding
of indiscriminate weapons, see Rule 71. Weapons That Are by Nature Indiscriminate, INT’L COMMITTEE
RED CROSS CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customaryihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter20_rule71 [https://perma.cc/H4KG-BFMG] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016),
which serves both a humanitarian and practical purpose.
114 A “doomsday device” is any technology that could destroy all life on a planet or the planet
itself; its usefulness depends largely on its capability to deter war. Much of the Cold War military
strategy depended on this risk of mutually assured destruction, and many classics of science fiction
are grounded on this concept. See, e.g., MORDECAI ROSHWALD, LEVEL 7 (1959); KURT
VONNEGUT, CAT’S CRADLE (1963); DR. STRANGELOVE OR: HOW I LEARNED TO STOP
WORRYING AND LOVE THE BOMB (Columbia Pictures 1964).
115 See, e.g., Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders: Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86
CALIF. L. REV. 939, 992 n.199 (1998) (“According to ‘realists,’ the international community bans
weapon systems only after discovering them to be largely ineffective or obsolete . . . .”). The United
States, for example, unilaterally renounced its biological weapons research after concluding they
were of limited military effectiveness. Bonnie Docherty, The Time is Now: A Historical Argument for
a Cluster Munitions Convention, 20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 53, 60 (2007).
116 See generally Eyal Benvenisti & Amichai Cohen, War is Governance: Explaining the Logic of
the Laws of War from a Principle–Agent Perspective, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1363 (2014).
117 See ARTICLE 36, KEY AREAS FOR DEBATE ON AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS 2 (2014)
http://www.article36.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/A36-CCW-May-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3MLN-WCEY] [hereinafter ARTICLE 36 BRIEFING PAPER] (“No state is likely to argue in favour
of the release of [autonomous weapon systems] without any form of human control whatsoever
. . . .”); see also DEP’T OF DEF. DIRECTIVE, supra note 4, at 2, 3 (requiring that autonomous weapon
systems are “designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise appropriate levels of human
judgment over the use of force” and suggesting that only “[h]uman-supervised” autonomous weapon
systems may be employed).
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autonomously.118 The design was technologically feasible, but in response to
customer requests, the manufacturer added two levels of human oversight.119
Despite the possibility of unpredictable action, autonomous weapon
systems promise a seductive combination of distance, accuracy, and
lethality—in part because they are capable of acting independently.120
Increased distance between soldiers and targets reduces risk to troops,121 but
historically this benefit came at the cost of accuracy,122 which in turn
demanded an increase in lethal force.123 Archers and bombardiers are safer
than foot soldiers and ground troops, but a foot soldier’s sword or firearm is
more accurate than an arrow or bomb. To accomplish similar combat
objectives at greater distances, early militaries increased the number of
archers; later ones increased the number of bombs dropped in a given attack
and their destructive power, with devastating effects for civilians. Only
recently has weapons technology advanced to a point that distant weapons
may also be extremely accurate.124 Precision-guided munitions presented the
prospect of relatively risk-free warfare, and remotely operated drones
extended this possibility to today’s asymmetric conflicts. Improved accuracy
has reduced the need for lethality,125 which has had a beneficial side effect for
civilians. As weapon systems become more accurate and require less lethal
force for effectiveness,126 what is considered a “proportionate” level of

118 Simon Parkin, Killer Robots: The Soldiers That Never Sleep, BBC (July 16, 2015), http://www.
bbc.com/future/story/20150715-killer-robots-the-soldiers-that-never-sleep [https://perma.cc/Q9A6-WLJ5].
119 Id.
120 See Oren Gross, The New Way of War: Is There a Duty to Use Drones?, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1, 30
(2015) (describing these as the “three main considerations” in the context of weapons development).
121 See id. at 30-33 (discussing the inverse relationship between proximity of the victim and the
trauma of the kill).
122 See id. at 34 (“An inverse relationship exists between distance and accuracy.”); cf. Michael
N. Schmitt, War, Technology, and the Law of Armed Conflict, 82 INT’L L. STUD. 137, 146 (2006)
(“Accuracy is the ability of a weapon to strike a specified location, known as the aimpoint. Precision,
by contrast, involves identifying targets in a timely fashion and striking them accurately.”).
123 See Gross, supra note 120, at 34.
124 See id. at 41 (“The shift to precision weapons has its origins in the Korean War and, even
more so, in the experience of the Vietnam war . . . .” (citations omitted)).
125 See id. at 39 (explaining the tradeoff between accuracy and lethality in that “making each
[inaccurate] projectile more lethal improved the chances that even if the target were not hit directly
it would destroyed”).
126 See id. at 48 (“[G]reater overall accuracy meant that smaller, less-lethal munitions could be
used. Greater precision and smaller armaments, in turn, brought a potential reduction in collateral
damage.”); Michael C. Horowitz & Paul Scharre, Do Killer Robots Save Lives?, POLITICO (Nov. 19,
2014),
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/11/killer-robots-save-lives-113010.html#.
VZ6QAflVhBc [https://perma.cc/ZG92-SVYK] (discussing the role of precision-guided munitions
in reducing civilian casualties).
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collateral damage has narrowed dramatically.127 In World War II, for example,
Great Britain and the United States targeted civilian population centers as
part of their overarching strategic plan;128 today, any civilian death associated
with a drone strike raises the question of whether the strike was unlawful,
prompting some to question whether states are now obligated to use the most
precise weapons in their arsenals.129 Autonomous weapon systems promise an
appealing next-generation combination of distance, accuracy, and lethality—
but at the cost of some unpredictability.
Additional financial, strategic, political, and moral incentives encourage
state investment in autonomous weapon systems.130 In certain situations—
when superhuman reaction time is necessary, in harsh environments, or on
effectively suicidal missions—autonomous weapon systems are uniquely
effective.131 They tackle dull, dirty, and dangerous tasks without complaint132
and reduce the number of human soldiers exposed to physically and
psychologically hazardous environments.133 They cut personnel costs, both
because they will substitute for human soldiers and because a single
supervisor can monitor multiple systems.134 Autonomous weapon systems are
less subject to jamming or takeover than their remotely-operated, semiautonomous equivalents, and they are faster learners and more likely to follow

127 The customary jus in bello proportionality requirement prohibits any attack in which injury
to civilians and civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage.
See First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 51(5)(b) (codifying the customary law).
128 Matthew Lippman, Aerial Attacks on Civilians and the Humanitarian Law of War: Technology and
Terror from World War I to Afghanistan, 33 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 1, 15-16 & n.143 (2002).
129 See, e.g., Anderson, The Rise of International Criminal Law, supra note 70, at 344; Gross, supra note
120, at 60; Christopher B. Puckett, In This Era of “Smart Weapons,” Is a State Under an International Legal
Obligation to Use Precision-Guided Technology in Armed Conflict?, 18 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 645 (2004).
130 See Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1865-68 (discussing additional incentives favoring
the development and deployment of autonomous weapon systems).
131 An official at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has observed that human
beings are becoming “the weakest link in defense systems.” P. W. Singer, Robots at War: The New
Battlefield, WILSON Q., Winter 2009, at 30, 37; see also Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1891
(observing that autonomous weapon systems are both “highly effective in certain circumstances”
and that “many of the objectives accomplished by autonomous weapon systems could not be similarly
achieved by other means”).
132 Dean Irvine, Doing Military’s Dangerous, Dull and Dirty Work, CNN (Feb. 16, 2012, 2:23 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/15/business/singapore-airshow-drones/ [http://perma.cc/R9G6-D8C9].
133 This is both a moral and political benefit. As a Navy chief petty officer noted on the loss of
his unit’s PackBot, “[W]hen a robot dies, you don’t have to write a letter to its mother.” Singer, supra
note 131, at 31.
134 See U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., UNMANNED SYSTEMS INTEGRATED ROADMAP FY 2013–2038, at
25 (2013), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/DOD-USRM-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/GK36-25TV]
[hereinafter DOD ROADMAP] (“[S]trides in autonomy . . . have reduced the number of personnel
required, but much more work needs to occur.”).
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orders than their human counterparts.135 Because their evaluations of a
situation will not be affected by human emotions (like anger or fear), human
frailties (like fatigue or boredom), or human prejudices (like racism or
scenario fulfillment), autonomous weapon systems may be more humane than
human soldiers.136
Meanwhile, many of the concerns raised about autonomous weapon
systems—that they might destabilize the security environment by encouraging
an arms race or by making it easier to use force, or that they may increase risk to
civilians by undermining important customary humanitarian protections137—are
deeply unsettling, but far less immediate and concrete. As a result, while states
acknowledge the risks this new weaponry might eventually pose to the international
order, they are unlikely to negotiate or implement an effective ban.138 With few
exceptions, states express interest in continued discussions of regulation139—while
135 As Paul Scharre points out, following orders to the letter is precisely the “quality that makes
[robotic systems] both reliable and maddening [as, u]nlike humans, autonomous systems lack the
ability to step outside their instructions and employ ‘common sense,’ adapting to the situation at
hand.” SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 6. Readers of Isaac Asimov have long been familiar with this
conundrum. See, e.g., ISAAC ASIMOV, Runaround, in I, ROBOT 25 (1950).
136 RONALD C. ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 29-30 (2009).
137 For a discussion of how the increased deployment of autonomous weapon systems might
make war politically easier and thereby affect the balance of the U.S. war power, see Rebecca
Crootof, War, Responsibility, and Killer Robots, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. 909 (2015).
138 See, e.g., KENNETH ANDERSON & MATTHEW WAXMAN, HOOVER INST., LAW AND
ETHICS FOR AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: WHY A BAN WON’T WORK AND HOW THE
LAWS OF WAR CAN (2013), http://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/uploads/documents/AndersonWaxman_LawAndEthics_r2_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/J682-YJ9W]; Crootof, Killer Robots,
supra note 4, at 1891-93 (arguing that only one of eight traits associated with successful bans holds
with respect to the enactment of a ban of autonomous weapon systems).
139 The few states that have explicitly called for a ban on “fully” autonomous weapon systems—Algeria,
Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ghana, the Holy See, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, the
state of Palestine, and Zimbabwe—are hardly military or technological powerhouses; the Holy See doesn’t
even have armed forces. CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS, COUNTRY VIEW ON KILLER ROBOTS
(2016), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/CountryViews_14Apr2016.pdf [https://
perma.cc/48G4-CWEY]. China and the United States have refrained from taking firm stances, but they are
generally in favor of continued international discussions. See, e.g., Michael W. Meier, U.S. Dep’t of State, 2014
Meeting of High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, Geneva (Nov.
13, 2014), https://geneva.usmission.gov/2014/11/13/u-s-statement-at-the-meeting-of-high-contracting
-parties-to-the-convention-on-certain-conventional-weapons-ccw/
[http://perma.cc/S2J6-9WYX]
(“[The United States] see[s] value in the constructive and open discussions [it] ha[s] already had . . . in recent
years.”); Wu Haitao, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary for Disarmament Affairs and Deputy
Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva and Other International Orgs.
in Switz., Statement at the 2014 Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons, Geneva (Nov. 13, 2014), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/
CD0B8EF0EF22A565C1257D97003D639F/$file/China_MSP_GS.pdf [https://perma.cc/WTE6-E4XG]
(“China supports further discussions on the issue . . . to carry out in-depth study on relevant aspects of the
issue . . . .”). Russia, in contrast, has expressed “severe doubts” about the usefulness of continuing an
international discussion on autonomous weapon systems. See CAMPAIGN TO STOP KILLER ROBOTS,
REPORT ON ACTIVITIES: CONVENTION ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS ANNUAL MEETING OF HIGH
CONTRACTING PARTIES, 3-4 (2014), http://www.stopkillerrobots.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/

2016]

War Torts

1373

they continue to pour money into developing increasingly autonomous
weapon systems.140
3. Inherent Unpredictability and Inevitable Accidents
Autonomous weapon systems are uniquely effective at accomplishing
certain military objectives, but they also are uniquely unpredictable. While
the actions of autonomous weapon systems may be largely foreseeable and
safe in most scenarios, it is impossible to guarantee that they will always
perform as expected.141 Quite the contrary; according to “normal accident”
theory, over a long enough time horizon, accidents are inevitable in complex
and tightly coupled systems.142 Given their inherent unpredictability and
their destructive capacity, autonomous weapon systems will eventually be
involved in an accident that constitutes a serious violation of international
humanitarian law.
First, the sheer complexity of an autonomous weapon system’s program may
make it impossible for human beings to predict how it will act with complete
accuracy—or even reconstruct why it acted a certain way after the fact.143 To the
extent autonomous weapon systems employ artificial neural networks—which
are designed to mimic biological neural networks and take action based on varied
kinds of inputs—the reason for the resulting action may be opaque even to the
system’s designers.144 This issue will be exacerbated to the extent autonomous

KRC_ReportCCW2014_22Dec2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AP6-HFHH] [hereinafter CSKR REPORT]
(discussing Russia’s doubts, which noted the “further we go into discussions . . . the greater the expectations
will be from the international community in terms of results.”). South Korea has suggested that there be no
restrictions on weapon systems used for peaceful purposes—which it would likely apply to its robotic
monitoring of the De-Militarized Zone. Ahn Youngjip, Permanent Mission of S. Kor. to the United Nations,
Meeting of Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons (May 13, 2014), http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/15FD27B028D31769C1257
CD8003E25CB/$file/ROK+LAWS+2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/975Z-ZAE6]. Israel has suggested that
autonomous weapon systems could eventually better comply with international humanitarian law than human
soldiers. CSKR REPORT, supra, at 20. Finally, the United Kingdom has explicitly opposed a ban. Owen
Bowcott, UK Opposes International Ban on Developing ‘Killer Robots,’ THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2015, 4:34 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/13/uk-opposes-international-ban-on-developing-killer-robots
[https://perma.cc/B7FX-ZLDL].
140 See, e.g., DOD ROADMAP, supra note 134, at 67 (identifying increasing autonomy in weapon
systems as a “high priority”); see also Jack Browne, UAV Markets Robust Despite Declining Spending, DEF.
ELECTRONICS (Feb. 15, 2012), http://defenseelectronicsmag.com/electronic-countermeasures/uavmarkets-robust-despite-declining-spending [https://perma.cc/3L24-Z5BQ] (discussing the stability in
defense funding for unmanned aerial vehicles, despite cuts in most other markets).
141 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 17.
142 Id. at 25.
143 Marchant et al., supra note 6, at 284.
144 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 15.
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weapon systems operate in complex and unpredictable environments,145 as all
scenarios cannot be anticipated (let alone tested).146
Second, autonomous weapon systems are subject to various kinds of
malfunction and corruption. The more complex the systems’ program, the
more opportunity there is for a “bug”—a programming error that causes an
unanticipated or unintended result.147 System failures may result from
unexpected interactions between different elements of the system.148 The
human-to-system interface introduces its own set of problems that are less
prevalent with human-to-human communication.149 For example, in 2009,
Air France Flight 447 crashed, resulting in the deaths of all 228 individuals
on board.150 The crash was particularly tragic, as it could have been avoided.151
It should have been relatively easy to recover from the plane’s aerodynamic
stall, but every time the human pilot took appropriate steps to reduce the
stall, the alarm system—which was silent while the stall exceeded its
parameters—went off, implying that he was taking the wrong action and
panicking him.152
As evidenced by the reactor meltdowns at Three Mile Island and
Fukushima and the Apollo 13, Challenger, and Columbia accidents, normal
accidents occur even in well-regulated, safety-conscious industries.153 Such
incidents are even more likely in armed conflicts, where individuals are
operating with incomplete information, there is an accelerated pace of
interaction, and an enemy is actively attempting to sabotage the endeavor.154
As noted above, notwithstanding their capability for unanticipated action
and their high damage potential, autonomous weapon systems are
increasingly being integrated into states’ armed forces. While states will
attempt to limit the risk that these systems will act in unforeseeable ways, it

Id. at 11.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 13 (“[I]n systems with millions of lines of code, some errors are inevitable.”).
Id. (observing that “[v]erifying all possible combinations of the internal workings of the
system becomes increasingly difficult as the system’s complexity increases”). The 2010 flash crash—
during which the U.S. stock market lost trillions of dollars in roughly a half-hour due in part to
interactions between algorithmic trading orders—exemplifies this problem.
149 M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction (Mar. 20,
2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing situations where miscommunications in
human-to-system interfaces resulted in unanticipated and preventable accidents).
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 25-30 (discussing these examples).
154 Id. at 34. Additionally, there is a risk that autonomous weapon systems will be hacked,
spoofed, or otherwise “tricked” into performing certain actions. Id. at 15. While this last point may
result in an autonomous weapon system acting in an unpredictable manner from the deployer’s
perspective, this is a different kind of unpredictably problem.
145
146
147
148
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will be impossible to accurately predict how a weapon system will act in all
possible situations—creating a new accountability gap.
B. No Individual Criminal Liability
Autonomous weapon systems will inevitably commit a serious violation
of international humanitarian law without any human being acting
intentionally or recklessly. Absent such willful human action, no one can—or
should—be held criminally liable.
1. The Willful Action Requirement
Under international law and most domestic legal regimes, war crimes
must be committed “willfully.”155 Depending on the type of violation, a
prosecutor must demonstrate that the accused acted with the intent to
commit the violation or acted recklessly.156 In its Commentary on the
Additional Protocols, the ICRC states that acting willfully includes acting
with “wrongful intent” or “recklessness,” which it describes as “the attitude of
an agent who, without being certain of a particular result, accepts the
possibility of it happening.”157 The ICRC distinguishes this from “ordinary
negligence or lack of foresight,” which occurs “when a man acts without
having his mind on the act or its consequences (although failing to take
necessary precautions, particularly failing to seek precise information,
constitutes culpable negligence punishable at least by disciplinary
sanctions).”158
Some treaties specify the required mental element for particular war
crimes. Article 130 of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949 includes in its
list of grave breaches the “wilful killing [of prisoners of war], torture or
155 See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 30(1) (“[A] person shall be criminally responsible
and liable for punishment . . . only if the material elements are committed with intent and
knowledge.”); see also Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 152
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FG6-WZRE] (“[T]he mens rea constituting all
the [grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions] includes both guilty intent and recklessness which
may be likened to serious criminal negligence.”).
156 There is already an inherent moral tension in holding an individual who acted with direct
intent and one who acted recklessly equally culpable. Jens David Ohlin, The Combatant’s Stance:
Autonomous Weapons on the Battlefield, 92 INT’L L. STUD. 1, 24-27 (2016). Ohlin suggests that this
tension might be alleviated by introducing a graduated scheme of criminal offenses; while this would
solve the intentional/recklessness problem, there are additional reasons to be wary of importing
negligence into criminal law. See infra subsection II.B.4.
157 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 994; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 437, 439 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116_judg_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AX-3ZXB].
158 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 994 (citations omitted).
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inhuman treatment, including biological experiments” and “wilfully
depriving a prisoner of war of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in
[the] Convention.”159 Article 85(3) of the First Additional Protocol of 1977
similarly criminalizes certain actions, such as launching indiscriminate attacks
against civilians, provided that they are committed willfully.160 Where the
requisite mental element is not codified, international courts and tribunals
have often imputed a mental element based on the nature of the violation. In
such circumstances, individuals have been held criminally liable only if they
acted intentionally or recklessly.161
Article 30 of the Rome Statute extends the willful standard to all serious
violations of international humanitarian law: “Unless otherwise provided, a
person shall be criminally responsible and liable for punishment for a crime
within the jurisdiction of the Court only if the material elements are
committed with intent and knowledge.”162 Intent to commit an action requires
evidence that the accused “means to engage in the conduct”;163 intent to
produce a consequence requires evidence that the accused “means to cause
that consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of
events.”164 “Knowledge,” meanwhile, entails “awareness that a circumstance
exists or a consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.”165
2. No Direct Individual Liability
Under international criminal law, individuals are responsible for war
crimes they commit or are directly involved in committing, which might
include planning or ordering the criminal act. Given the willfulness
requirement, no one can currently be held directly liable for the independent
and sometimes unpredictable actions of an autonomous weapon system.
Certainly, an individual who intentionally programmed an autonomous
weapon system to commit a serious violation of international humanitarian
law could be prosecuted for a war crime, as could one who recklessly deployed
an autonomous weapon system incapable of discriminating between lawful

159 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 33, art. 130.
160 First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 85(3).
161 CASSESE, supra note 8, at 76; see also KNUT DÖRMANN, ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES
UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: SOURCES AND
COMMENTARY 43 (2003) (“It may be concluded from the cases rendered by the ad hoc Tribunals

that the notion ‘wilfull’ includes ‘intent’ and recklessness’, but excludes ordinary negligence.”).
162 Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 30(1) (emphasis added).
163 Id. art. 30(2)(a).
164 Id. art. 30(2)(b).
165 Id. art. 30(3).
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and unlawful targets in an urban area.166 A commander who ordered that an
autonomous weapon system be used inappropriately would also be directly
liable for its actions, and a commander who became aware that an autonomous
weapon system had been used or was about to be used to commit a war crime
but who took no action to prevent or punish the violation would be indirectly
criminally liable.167 Those are the easy cases.
This Article focuses instead on the hard case: whether anyone might be held
accountable in the more complicated situation where no individual acts
intentionally or recklessly, but an autonomous weapon system nonetheless takes
action that constitutes a serious violation of international humanitarian law.
At present, there is little sense in attempting to hold autonomous weapon
systems themselves liable. Artificial intelligence has not advanced to a point
where a robotic system could be said to act intentionally or recklessly. If a
violation of international humanitarian law is not a war crime absent some
willful action, autonomous weapon systems are currently incapable of
committing war crimes.168 Additionally, traditional justifications for individual
liability in criminal law—deterrence, retribution, restoration, incapacitation,
and rehabilitation—do not map well from human beings to robots.169
Some analogize autonomous weapon systems to more conventional
weapons, others to human soldiers. Either way, if no person acts willfully, no
person can be held directly criminally liable. If an autonomous weapon
system is merely another weapon in a state’s arsenal, its deployer will be liable
only if she intended or foresaw the reasonable likelihood of civilian harm and
nonetheless used the weapon system. If instead it is analogized to a soldier
going rogue, the deployer could be held directly liable only for actions that
resulted in serious violations if she ordered or otherwise directly contributed
to the execution of that unlawful action. Similarly, regardless of the analogy,
the commanding officer and the weapon system’s programmers, designers, or
manufacturers could be held directly responsible only to the extent they

166 Jeffrey S. Thurnher, Examining Autonomous Weapon Systems from a Law of Armed Conflict
Perspective, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 213, 225 (Hitoshi Nasu
& Robert McLaughlin eds., 2014).
167 Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 111, at 277.
168 Additionally, international criminal tribunals’ jurisdiction is generally limited to “natural
persons,” which would prevent bringing suit against a weapon system. MIND THE GAP, supra note
19, at 19. Presumably, however, should autonomous weapon systems eventually have human-like
cognitive capabilities such that they could act intentionally and punishment might serve as a form
of deterrence, tribunals’ jurisdiction could be expanded to include entities with artificial intelligence.
169 But see GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE UNDER
CRIMINAL LAW (2013) (arguing that robots can be held criminally liable and punished, much like
human beings and corporations).

1378

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1347

willfully contributed to the crime’s commission.170 Assuming no one intended
the violation or acted recklessly, no one can be held directly liable.171
3. No Indirect Individual Liability
In certain circumstances, military commanders and civilian superiors may
be held indirectly criminally liable for a subordinate’s crime. The customary
doctrine of “superior responsibility” or “command responsibility” has been
codified differently in different international agreements, but it is generally
understood that a superior may be liable if she exercises effective control over
a subordinate, knows of or has reason to know of the subordinate’s actual or
intended criminal acts, and fails to take necessary and reasonable measures to
prevent or punish them.172
This doctrine grew from the desire to address a particular kind of guilt:
the failure to act to prevent a war crime or the failure to deter others from
acting similarly by punishing those who do commit war crimes. Given this
purpose, the main elements of this indirect form of liability—a subordinate
who commits a criminal and chargeable offense, effective control, actual or
constructive knowledge, and failure to act—are sensible. If there was no
underlying crime, there was nothing to prevent. If a superior does not
exercise effective control over another or does not know or have reason to
know of that person’s potential unlawful conduct, she could not have
prevented that individual from acting. Finally, if the superior could have
averted or discouraged unlawful actions, either by preventing or punishing
the subordinate, and chooses not to, she implicitly condones and thus perhaps
even surreptitiously encourages others to act similarly.
Because the doctrine of indirect liability is premised on an individual’s
omissions or failure to fulfill a duty, it has an unusual mental element, in that
170 For a more in-depth analysis of obstacles to direct criminal liability for developers, see Tim
McFarland & Tim McCormack, Mind the Gap: Can Developers of Autonomous Weapons Systems Be
Liable for War Crimes?, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 361 (2014).
171 Mind the Gap suggests an additional practical problem: even if operators, programmers, and
manufacturers could be held directly liable for the subsequent actions of an autonomous weapon
system, it would be difficult to determine which one was responsible for the orders that resulted in the
violation. And, of course, each entity would attempt to shift blame to the others. MIND THE GAP, supra
note 19, at 20. But courts regularly deal with such questions of fact in criminal and tort law; this is
hardly an insurmountable obstacle to prosecution were a direct liability regime to be created.
172 See, e.g., Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 6(3), Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S.
145; Rome Statute, supra note 13, art. 28; Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
art. 6(3), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598; Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia art. 7(3), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192; First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, arts.
86-87; see also Prosecutor v. Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, ¶ 346 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/tjug/en/981116
_judg_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C5AX-3ZXB] (applying the doctrine of command responsibility). For
a summary of the development of this customary rule, see CASSESE, supra note 8, at 182-87.
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a showing of something less than intentional or reckless action may be
sufficient to establish guilt.173 In one extreme situation, a commander was
held strictly liable for his subordinates’ actions,174 but this approach has since
been rejected.175 Today, tribunals tend to apply something akin to a gross or
culpable negligence standard when evaluating if superiors are indirectly liable
for their subordinates’ crimes.176
This doctrine was never meant to create a fully independent source of
liability; it rests on the assumption that there can only be indirect liability for
failure to prevent or punish a criminal action for which someone else is
directly liable. As a result, the elements currently required for indirect
liability do not map well onto a situation where no human being acts
intentionally or recklessly.
First, superiors are responsible for a failure to prevent or punish only
those actions that constitute chargeable criminal offenses (regardless of
whether the subordinate is charged).177 But as autonomous weapon systems
do not act willfully, they cannot be charged with a war crime.178 They are
incapable of committing a chargeable offense.
Second, it is not clear what would constitute “effective control” over
autonomous weapon systems. When a commander gives a subordinate an
order, the commander remains responsible for taking necessary precautions
against that subordinate committing an unlawful act; he oversees the
subordinate and can punish any violation the subordinate commits. This de
facto control is necessary for indirect liability: de jure control alone is
insufficient if the commander cannot prevent and punish a subordinate’s
criminal acts.179 But it is impossible to punish an autonomous weapon system
and difficult to prevent its unforeseeable actions. Even if a commander is
monitoring the system in real time (which defeats an aim of developing
173 See Alberto Gargani, Negligence (“[T]he negligent failure to supervise expands the mental
element beyond intent and recklessness . . . .”), in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 433, 433-34 (Antonio Casssese ed. 2009).
174 See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (holding that, although there was no direct evidence
linking Yamashita to his subordinates’ crimes, he failed in his duty to control, prevent, or punish his
subordinates’ actions).
175 See Beatrice I. Bonafé, Command Responsibility (“As the ad hoc tribunals have repeatedly
underscored, command responsibility is not a form of strict liability.”), in OXFORD COMPANION,
supra note 173, at 270, 271.
176 See CASSESE, supra note 8, at 53 (“Gross negligence is clearly required by the customary
rules on superiors’ responsibility . . . .”); id. at 76. But see Bonafé, supra note 175, at 271 (“[N]egligence
is not a basis of liability in the context of command responsibility.”).
177 GUÉNAËL METTRAUX, THE LAW OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY 131-34 (2009).
178 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 21-22.
179 Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalić, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 197 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/
en/cel-aj010220.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PQW-WYDZ].
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weapons autonomy in the first place), she will be unable to call off an unlawful
attack in situations where the system employs faster-than-human reaction
times in response to surprising environmental conditions. Accordingly, some
have concluded that because commanders could never exercise effective
control over autonomous weapon systems, their usage creates a legal loophole,
allowing commanders to authorize uses of force without having to take
responsibility for them.180
Third, the hard case presumes that commanders do not have actual
knowledge of the autonomous weapon system’s actions. If the weapon system is
operating under human oversight, the commander might gain such knowledge of
the impending violation in real time. If she has such knowledge and does not act
to prevent the action, the commander could be presumed to be willfully and
directly contributing to the crime—but this is one version of the easy case.181 In
the hard case, oversight will not necessarily provide the supervisor with sufficient
information, time, or means to call off an unlawful action.
The question then would be whether the commander had “reason to know
of ” the likely violation. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia has held that this standard is met only if commanders receive
information that puts them “on notice of the risk” that is “sufficiently
alarming to justify further inquiry.”182 Thus, at least as the law currently
stands, “[c]ommanders cannot be held liable for negligently failing to find out

180 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 24; Peter Asaro, On Banning Autonomous Weapon Systems:
Human Rights, Automation, and the Dehumanization of Lethal Decision-Making, 94 INT’L REV. RED
CROSS 687, 701 (2012); Heather M. Roff, Killing in War: Responsibility, Liability, and Lethal
Autonomous Robots, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF ETHICS AND WAR 352, 357-58 (Fritz Allhof,
Nicholas G. Evans & Adam Henschke eds., 2013).
Alternatively, some have suggested that the accountability problem might be solved by
requiring that all weapons be “meaningfully controlled”: presumably, if every weapon is
meaningfully controlled by a human being, there will always be someone accountable for its actions.
See, e.g., MIND THE GAP, supra note 19. But even if states reach consensus on what “meaningful
human control” actually entails, see Rebecca Crootof, The Meaning of “Meaningful Human Control,”
30 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. (forthcoming 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2705560 [https://perma.cc/L7DN-U7LE] (discussing the lack of consensus as to what
this principle requires), such a principle will not solve the mens rea issue. A human operator might
make an informed decision, based on sufficient information, training, and a well-tested weapon—
and an autonomous weapon system might nonetheless act in a way that results in a serious violation
of international humanitarian law. At that point, it will be possible to identify which person or
people were in putative control of the system—but as they cannot be held criminally liable absent
willful action, there will still be an accountability gap. Cf. CSKR REPORT, supra note 139, at 17
(quoting India as questioning whether “meaningful human control” is “adequate to establish [a]
relationship between autonomy and accountability”).
181 See supra text accompanying notes 167–170.
182 Prosecutor v. Strugar, Case No. IT-01-42-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶¶ 297-98 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 17, 2008), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/strugar/
acjug/en/080717.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F4R-6JJF].
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information without having received some alarming information.”183 Aside
from its innate capacity for unpredictable action, however, it is unclear what
would constitute sufficiently alarming information to constitute notice of a
risk for autonomous weapon systems:
[W]ould knowledge of past unlawful acts committed by one robot provide
notice of risk only for that particular robot, or for all robots of its make,
model, and/or programming? Would knowledge of one type of past unlawful
act . . . trigger notice of the risk of other types of unlawful acts . . . ? Would
fully autonomous weapons be predictable enough to provide commanders
with the requisite notice of potential risk? Would liability depend on a
particular commander’s individual understanding of the complexities of
programming and autonomy?184

The fact that an autonomous weapon system has the capacity for independent
and thus unpredictable action alone should not be sufficient to put
commanders on notice; if that were all that were required, commanders could
be presumed to be eternally on notice that human soldiers might commit an
unlawful act, and there would be no need for this separate element. An
autonomous weapon system might act predictably the vast majority of the
time—it is impossible to predict when a normal accident may occur.
In short, it is either difficult or impossible to apply many of the required
elements for indirect liability—an inferior who commits a criminal and
chargeable offense, effective control, actual or constructive knowledge—to
situations where no human being acts willfully but an autonomous weapon
system’s action nonetheless has tragic and disastrous consequences.185
4. The Problems with Criminalizing Negligence
Perhaps the most commonly proposed solution to the accountability gap
is the idea that the doctrine of indirect responsibility can be modified to
create liability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems.186 One of the
most creative of these is Geoffrey Corn’s offshoot, termed “procurement

MIND THE GAP, supra note 19, at 22.
Id. at 23.
Mind the Gap also notes that prosecutions based on indirect responsibility are difficult, as
they often require state cooperation and the provision of internal military evidence. Id. at 21. Rather
than being unique to situations involving autonomous weapon systems, this is an issue with all
foreign and international prosecutions based on superior responsibility.
186 See, e.g., Christof Heyns, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions, ¶ 81, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/47 (Apr. 9, 2013) [hereinafter Heyns Report]
(“[A]mendments to the rules regarding command responsibility may be needed to cover the use of
[autonomous weapon systems].”).
183
184
185
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responsibility,” under which the military or civilian officials who procure
certain weapons will be held responsible for the actions of those weapons.187
When boiled down to the essentials, however, all of these suggestions are
really about creating a criminal negligence standard.188 As noted above,
because no one can be held directly liable for the actions of an autonomous
weapon system under existing law, no one can be held indirectly liable.189
Instead, the doctrine of superior responsibility would need to be substantially
reworked to create liability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems.190
Building off of the original doctrine and replacing the subordinate with an
autonomous weapon system, this new doctrine might be expressed as: “An
individual may be liable if she exercises effective control over an autonomous
weapon system, knows or had reason to know of its propensity to violate
international humanitarian law, and fails to take necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent those unlawful actions.”191 In other words, an individual
may be liable if she negligently deploys an autonomous weapon system and
it violates international humanitarian law.192
Expanding the mental element for a war crime to include negligence is
not entirely unprecedented. In 1921, the Leipzig Supreme Court found a
captain guilty of causing “death through culpable negligence” after he passed
on what he incorrectly believed was a superior’s order to kill all enemy
187 Geoffrey S. Corn, Autonomous Weapon Systems: Managing the Inevitability of “Taking
the Man Out of the Loop” 21 (unpublished manuscript), https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/3894corn-understanding-the-loop-regulating-the-next [https://perma.cc/9KMQ-2VGQ].
188 This is not surprising, given that, in deciding indirect liability cases, courts often apply a
mens rea standard akin to gross negligence. See supra note 176. Similarly, although he does not use
the word, Corn’s proposed “procurement responsibility” would apply a criminal negligence standard:
“[T]hese officials . . . will be accountable for objectively foreseeable failures of the weapon review
and compliance validation process.” Corn, supra note 187, at 23.
189 See supra subsection II.B.3.
190 See Marco Sassòli, Autonomous Weapons and International Humanitarian Law: Advantages,
Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified, 90 INT’L L. STUD. 308, 324 (2014) (arguing
that holding a commander responsible for the actions of an autonomous weapon system would be
more akin to direct responsibility than command responsibility).
191 See Heyns Report, supra note 186, ¶ 78 (suggesting that, “[s]ince a commander can be held
accountable for an autonomous human subordinate, holding a commander accountable for an
autonomous robot subordinate may appear analogous,” and noting that this will work only if military
commanders are “in a position to understand the complex programming of [autonomous weapon
systems] sufficiently well to warrant criminal liability”).
192 It is important to distinguish between recklessness and negligence. A reckless individual
acts knowing that she risks the consequences; a negligent individual does not take sufficient
precautions against a risk that a reasonable man would have foreseen. CASSESE, supra note 8, at 76.
There are also varying levels of negligence. “Gross” or “culpable” negligence exists when an actor
is aware of a risk associated with his actions but “believes that the harmful consequences of his conduct
will not occur, thanks to the measures he has taken, or is about to take.” Gargani, supra note 173, at 433.
“Simple,” “inadvertent,” or “mere” negligence “exists when an actor is not aware of the risk that failure
to comply with accepted standards of conduct may bring about harmful effects . . . .” Id.
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wounded.193 (Today, however, that same captain would likely be found guilty
of acting with intention; killing wounded soldiers is a war crime, and
following a superior’s orders is not a defense.) Many states criminalize
negligent conduct resulting in human harm,194 and a few even allow for the
domestic prosecution of war crimes committed negligently.195
However, there is good reason to be uncomfortable with importing
negligence—and the attendant tort-based reasoning—into criminal law.196 In
distinguishing between tort and criminal law, John Coffee has emphasized
that “[c]haracteristically, tort law prices, while criminal law prohibits.”197
Where society wants to prohibit a certain behavior, tort law is problematic, as
“there cannot be an ‘optimal’ rate of crime that is to be attained by pricing
the subject behavior.”198 The negligence standard—which attempts to
determine which precautions an actor should take before the marginal costs
to the actor of taking the precautions equal the marginal benefits to the victim
in terms of reduced expected losses—thus fits awkwardly into criminal law—
which is intended to eliminate (or at least minimize) certain activities.199
This problem grows tenfold when applying a negligence standard to
evaluating individual liability for war crimes.200 Unsurprisingly, in a zone
where the killing of other human beings is sanctioned, lethal accidents

193 CASSESE, supra note 8, at 54 n.30; see also German General Free, Major Gets Two Years:
Crusius Convicted at Leipsic of Slaying Prisoners, but Stenger Is Acquitted, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1921, at 2.
194 See, e.g., U.S. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918–19 (2012) (criminalizing
reckless and culpable negligent acts that result in an unlawful death); MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL UNITED STATES ¶ 85(c) (rev. ed. 2012) (imposing criminal liability on an individual
whose conduct results in another’s death if the individual “is under a duty to use due care” and
“exhibits a lack of that degree of care of the safety of others which a reasonably careful person would
have exercised under the same or similar circumstances”).
195 See Practice Relating to Rule 156. Definition of War Crimes, INT’L COMMITTEE RED CROSS
CUSTOMARY INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. DATABASE, https://www.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/
v2_rul_rule156 [https://perma.cc/JYF5-S35B] (last visited Apr. 15, 2016) (noting that Azerbaijan and
the Netherlands provide that war crimes may be committed negligently).
196 The problems associated with eroding the line between crimes and torts are not unique to
war crimes or to the international legal order: criminal law scholars across the world are concerned
about overcriminalizaion. See, e.g., Lorena Bachmaier Winter, Carlos Gómez-Jara Díez & Albert
Ruda-González, Blurred Borders in Spanish Tort and Crime (“The dominant development in
substantive criminal law has been the disappearance of any clearly definable line between civil and
criminal law. This blurring of the border between tort and crime results not only in injustice, but
ultimately weakens the efficacy of criminal law as an instrument of social control.”), in COMPARING
TORT AND CRIME: LEARNING FROM ACROSS AND WITHIN LEGAL SYSTEMS 223, 223 (Matthew
Dyson ed., 2015); see also Coffee, supra note 68.
197 Coffee, supra note 68, at 194; see also Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach
to Non-Fault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1965).
198 Coffee, supra note 68, at 194.
199 Calabresi, supra note 197, at 718-19; Coffee, supra note 68, at 194-95 & n.5.
200 Because it often employs a negligence-like standard, the doctrine of command responsibility
is one of the more controversial aspects of international criminal law.
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happen. As evidenced by the proportionality requirement,201 which
essentially endorses a non-excessive amount of unintended civilian death,
armed conflict is intended to be a dangerous activity. If an individual could
be held criminally liable for negligent actions in war and if her commander
would be indirectly liable for negligence, every commander would be a war
criminal.202
Some might think this would be a positive development; if combatants
and commanders are criminally liable for lethal results of negligent actions,
they may be deterred from careless action203—or even from engaging in
warfare at all. But instead of bringing an end to all war, overcriminalization
will undermine all of international criminal law. Prosecutions of criminal
negligence will either appear to be driven more by politics than wrongdoing
or will not be brought at all. In short, if everyone is a criminal, no one is.204
Even if criminal negligence liability were formally limited to situations
involving autonomous weapon systems, there is still a slippery slope
problem—it is hard to justify prosecuting someone for criminal negligence
because they deployed one kind of weapon, and not if they happened to use
a different one that nonetheless resulted in equally disastrous consequences.
Eventually, the negligent use of all types of weapons would be prosecuted.
Importing negligence into criminal law would also undermine the legal
regime’s moral legitimacy, as it would be morally unjust to hold anyone
criminally liable for the independent and unpredictable actions of
autonomous weapon systems. Robert Sparrow was one of the first to advance
this argument.205 He concluded that, because no one can ethically be assigned
liability for the actions of autonomous systems, such systems should not be
developed or used.206 Others have expanded on Sparrow’s reasoning to argue
that autonomous weapon systems threaten the structure of just war theory,207

201

See First Additional Protocol, supra note 35, art. 51(5)(b).
Cf. John Fabian Witt, Form and Substance in the Law of Counterinsurgency Damages, 41 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1455, 1471-75 (2008) (describing the various events undergirding the hundreds of
Foreign Claims Act (10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2012)) claims in Iraq and Afghanistan from January 2005
through June 2006, including “checkpoint shootings, motor vehicle accidents, accidental weapon
discharges” and “warning shots gone awry”).
203 Cf. United States v. Kick, 7 M.J. 82, 84 (C.N.A. 1979) (suggesting that “[t]here is a special
need in the military to make the killing of another as a result of simple negligence a criminal act”
because “[t]he danger to others from careless acts is so great”).
204 It may well be that “stigma is a scarce resource.” Coffee, supra note 68, at 238.
205 See Robert Sparrow, Killer Robots, 24 J. APPLIED PHIL. 62 (2007).
206 Id. at 66.
207 Roff, supra note 180, at 353 (arguing that, because autonomous weapon systems will never be
“truly autonomous in the philosophical sense of the word,” they are not moral agents and therefore
threaten a cornerstone of just war theory: the moral equality of soldiers and the liability for killing).
202
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that they are inherently unlawful208 or that they should be banned
altogether.209 These writers are partially correct. It would be morally
inappropriate to hold individuals criminally liable for the actions of an
autonomous weapon system, at least in the hard case where no one acted
willfully. But that does not mean this new weaponry is inherently unlawful or
must be banned;210 instead, it suggests that we should consider alternative
sources of accountability.
It has taken nearly seventy years of effort to construct the current
international criminal legal regime, and it is still capable of being derailed.
Expanding the mens rea requirement for a war crime to include negligence
threatens to destabilize an already shaky regime. If international criminal
law’s practical and moral legitimacy is undermined, the humanitarian
protections it was designed to preserve will lose one of their few enforcement
mechanisms.
*

*

*

Ever since the Nuremberg judges declared that “[c]rimes against
international law are committed by men, not by abstract entities, and only by
punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced,”211 international criminal law proponents have
sought to create and strengthen an international legal regime to hold
individuals accountable for war crimes they commit or could have prevented.
With the advent of autonomous weapon systems, however, it is now
possible that serious violations of international humanitarian law may in fact
be committed by “abstract entities” without any human being acting willfully,
resulting in an accountability gap where no one—not the deployer,

208 See Mary Ellen O’Connell, Banning Autonomous Killing: The Legal and Ethical Requirement
That Humans Make Near-Time Lethal Decisions (“[Autonomous weapon systems] would conflict with
the historical, legal, and moral understanding that killing should be based on a good-faith
understanding of real necessity and carried out by someone who may be held accountable for a wrong
decision.”), in THE AMERICAN WAY OF BOMBING: CHANGING ETHICAL AND LEGAL NORMS,
FROM FLYING FORTRESSES TO DRONES 224, 236 (Matthew Evangelista & Henry Shue eds., 2014).
209 MIND THE GAP, supra note 19; see also Kathleen Lawand, Fully Autonomous Weapons Systems,
INT’L COMM. RED CROSS (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/statement/
2013/09-03-autonomous-weapons.htm [https://perma.cc/5MRN-99GK] (“If responsibility cannot be
determined as required by [international humanitarian law], is it legal or ethical to deploy such systems?”).
210 Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1881 (“Whether a weapon is per se unlawful is not,
and has never been, based on whether an individual can be held accountable for violations following
from its use.”).
211 Judgement (Oct. 1, 1946), in 1 THE TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL NUREMBERG, 14 NOVEMBER 1945–1 OCTOBER 1946, at
171, 223 (1947).
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commander, programmer, developer, manufacturer, or the weapon system
itself—can be held criminally liable.
III. INTRODUCING “WAR TORTS”
“War crimes” are widely recognized as serious violations of international
humanitarian law that give rise to individual criminal liability. This Article
proposes explicitly identifying “war torts” as serious violations of
international humanitarian law that give rise to state responsibility. These
categories are not mutually exclusive; the same action may simultaneously be
a war crime and a war tort, just as an action in domestic law may be both a
crime and a tort.
Rather than outlining a comprehensive international tort liability regime
akin to what has developed in international criminal law, this Part considers
factors relevant to developing a pilot war torts regime focused on ensuring
accountability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems. First, however,
it is worth discussing why there is a need to recognize war torts.
A. Why “War Torts”?
As noted above, the law of state responsibility does not distinguish
between treaty breaches, torts, or crimes; everything is encompassed in the
term “internationally wrongful act,”212 and serious violations of international
humanitarian law are merely one subset of possible internationally wrongful
acts. Yet, with the rise of international criminal law, the language of violations
in the context of international humanitarian law has shifted. Everything—
the civilian deaths associated with drone strikes to the downing of Malaysian
flight MH17—is now popularly termed a “war crime.”213
Certainly, it is easier, and more viscerally powerful, to forego the jargon of
“internationally wrongful acts” or “serious violation of international
humanitarian law” in favor of “war crimes.” But, as George Carlin has noted,
“We do think in language. And so the quality of our thoughts and ideas can
only be as good as the quality of our language.”214 Calling all serious violations
of international humanitarian law “war crimes” contributes to the erasure of the
role of state responsibility, implying that there cannot be a serious violation
without a morally culpable perpetrator. We need a separate term, a different
name, for violations where there is fault, regardless of whether or not there is
also guilt.

212
213
214

Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 2; see also Draft Articles Commentaries, supra note 29, at 55, 111.
See, e.g., Heller, supra note 3 (arguing against framing the downing of flight MH17 as a war crime).
George Carlin: Doin’ It Again (HBO television broadcast Mar. 23, 1990).

2016]

War Torts

1387

The various theories of tort law share a common assumption: that tort
liability is grounded in a different kind of culpability than criminal law. While
criminal law and tort law serve some of the same purposes—deterring
undesirable actions through sanctions, holding those responsible for harm
accountable, ingraining norms of conduct—the two legal regimes govern
fundamentally different kinds of wrongs.
Criminal law links legal culpability to moral culpability. As William
Blackstone observed, “[A]s a vicious will without a vicious act is no civil
crime, so, on the other hand, an unwarrantable act without a vicious will is no
crime at all.”215 Absent moral culpability, justifications for punishment ring
hollow.216 Accordingly, some states refuse to create strict liability crimes
entirely, on the grounds that it is incompatible with the nulla poena sine culpa
principle—that there be no punishment without guilt.
In contrast, the economic analysis of tort law dispenses with questions of
moral culpability entirely. It describes tort law as the product of efficiency
and optimal deterrence, a method of cost allocation for accidents.217 Under
this theory, tort law is an ex post attempt to determine a hypothetical ex ante
contract (that the injurer would have made with the injuree), a reason to have
liability rather than property rules.218 At the same time, tort law is largely
forward-looking, insofar as it is intended to influence rational actors’ future
behavior.
A second theory of tort law—the corrective justice theory—views tort as
creating remedies for harms resulting from breaches of interpersonal
duties.219 There is a duty not to injure others in certain, legally defined ways;
if an injury occurs, there is a duty to repair.220 This understanding of tort law
is backwards-looking and circumstance-specific. While it is grounded in
justice, it is a compensatory, “corrective” justice, concerned far less with
questions of moral culpability than the retributive justice of criminal law.221

BLACKSTONE, supra note 69, at *21.
Relatedly, the few strict liability crimes that do exist—like traffic violations—carry
relatively low levels of social stigma.
217 Jules Coleman, Scott Hershovitz & Gabriel Mendlow, Theories of the Common Law of Torts,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/tort-theories/ [https://perma.cc/
6YC7-J5XB] (last updated Dec. 17, 2015) (explaining that optimal deterrence theory views the goal
of tort law as “minimiz[ing] the sum of the costs of accidents and the costs of avoiding them”).
218 See, e.g., Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 68.
219 Theories of the Common Law of Torts, supra note 217.
220 See id. (“[A]n individual has a duty to repair the wrongful losses that his conduct causes.”).
221 See id. (“Many theorists believe that a principle of retributive justice—say, that the
blameworthy deserve to suffer—does a good job of interpreting and justifying criminal law. Yet most
theorists think that such a principle does a rather poor job of interpreting and justifying tort law
(except, perhaps, for the part of tort law concerned with punitive damages).”).
215
216
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Finally, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have championed
responsibility-based theories as a third theoretical option (as opposed to a
subset of corrective justice theory).222 Under their civil recourse theory, tort
liability “is a concrete, institutionalized, and practical form of moral
responsibility for having wrongfully injured someone.”223 But even under this
theory, which is self-consciously grounded in morality, injurious wrongs may
overlap with—but are to be distinguished from—“blameworthy” wrongs.224
In short, criminal law generally is concerned with moral wrongs, guilt, and
prohibiting certain actions; tort law focuses on injurious wrongs, fault, and
regulation of valuable but sometimes dangerous activities. Focusing only on
morally blameworthy harms risks marginalizing unintended but injurious
harms: thus, the development of a “war crimes” regime necessitates
recognizing a corresponding “war torts” regime.
A war torts regime would serve many beneficial purposes. It would clarify
the applicability of the law of state responsibility in armed conflict—
specifically, the duty to make full reparations for injuries caused by
internationally wrongful acts225—by delineating what violations are
sufficiently serious to require reparation.226 Public recognition of state fault
and states’ acceptance of responsibility would also entrench norms of lawful
behavior. Looking forward, a war torts regime would hopefully deter states
from employing means and methods of warfare that result in serious
violations of international humanitarian law.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, a war torts regime would help ensure
that victims of states’ internationally wrongful actions could receive
compensation for their injuries, which would not occur in the war crimes context.
The fact that civilians are expected to shoulder the economic—to say nothing of
the emotional—costs of the proportionality analysis is deeply troubling. As
Michael Reisman has noted,
The euphemism “collateral damage” means death and injury of
noncombatants and destruction of their property. That term of art may
insulate the party that has caused this damage from international criminal
responsibility and, perhaps, moral self-doubt. It should not absolve it from a
222 See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Responsibility
(distinguishing responsibility theory from corrective justice theory), in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW OF TORTS 17, 25-26 (John Oberdiek ed. 2014).
223 Id. at 36.
224 See id. at 29 (“Tort law’s definitions of wrongdoing depart to some degree from full-blooded
moral wrongs.”).
225 Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 31.
226 While the “serious” standard is admittedly vague, state practice would give it meaning,
much as the “serious” standard for war crimes has been clarified through state practice, treaty
negotiations, and international dialogue.
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civil obligation to compensate, directly and promptly, the victims or their
survivors, regardless of whether the actions of the damage-feasor violated the
laws of war or merely caused “collateral damage.”227

Nearly every system of law is grounded on the idea that harms must be
compensated; a war torts regime would introduce an additional check on the
use of military force228 and create a means by which states might alleviate at
least the economic costs of their actions.229
Not only do autonomous weapon systems highlight the need for war torts,
they also may provide the ideal test case for developing a war torts regime.
B. Accountability for Autonomous Weapon Systems
In the absence of the term “war torts,” when faced with new scenarios, we
are asking the wrong questions. Many pieces of current scholarship on the
accountability gap are grounded on some variant of the inquiry, “Who can be
held accountable when an autonomous weapon system commits a war crime?”
Instead, we should be asking, “What is an appropriate liability regime for
autonomous weapon systems?”
The answer is, of course, it depends. When an autonomous weapon
system is used recklessly or with the intention of committing a war crime,
international criminal law is appropriate. But both with regard to some war
crimes and in the hard case where no individual acts willfully, states should
be held accountable for their war torts.
1. Holding States Responsible
Both entities and individuals may be liable for torts in domestic law,
suggesting two possibilities for war tort liability: individual liability and state
responsibility.
Reisman, supra note 22, at 397.
Upping the financial costs of military action might address the concern that, by reducing
the human costs of war, autonomous weapon systems and other advanced military technologies make
it “easier” for technologically-advanced states to use military force. See Crootof, War, Responsibility,
and Killer Robots, supra note 137.
229 Many states already voluntarily assume this responsibility in the context of armed conflicts,
see infra subsection III.B.1, and some have argued that it should extend to all extraterritorial actions.
For example, following a 1998 incident wherein a U.S. training flight in Italy severed a cable-car line
and caused the death of twenty people, former marine and Senator Charles Robb called for the
United States to compensate the victim’s families: “While compensation cannot replace the lost
children, husbands and wives, it can demonstrate that we accept complete responsibility for their
deaths . . . . While it may never be clear exactly which individual act caused the accident, it is clear
that ultimate responsibility lies with the United States.” Letter from Charles S. Robb, U.S. Senator,
to United States Senate (Mar. 10, 1999) (cited in Michael Reisman, The Incident at Cavalese and
Strategic Compensation, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 505, 509-10 (2000)).
227
228
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Although individual liability for international torts is recognized in some
domestic law,230 similar individual tort liability does not exist in the
international sphere. This is likely due to the fact that, until recently, only
states were recognized as legal actors in the international order.231 As
evidenced by international criminal law, however, it is now possible to
construct a new legal regime grounded on individual liability. That being
acknowledged, it seems both more likely and normatively preferable to hold
states, rather than individuals, accountable for the actions of autonomous
weapon systems.232
At the practical level, not only is the state in the best position to ensure
that autonomous weapon systems are designed and employed in compliance
with international humanitarian law, states will also have pockets deep
enough to adequately compensate victims of their actions.233 Also, given that
states are responsible for developing, purchasing, and integrating increasingly
autonomous weapon systems in their military forces, state responsibility may
operate as a more effective deterrent to overuse than individual liability.234

230 See, e.g., Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012) (granting federal jurisdiction over torts
committed by individuals and entities in violation of international law).
231 Indeed, international criminal law was revolutionary in large part because it held
individuals accountable on a stage where once only states were recognized legal actors. Now,
“transnational norm entrepreneurs” are increasingly involved in treaty negotiations, see Harold
Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV.
623, 656-63 (1998) (discussing the role of nonstate actors with regard to the Mine Ban Treaty), and
“both intra-state and non-state actors are playing an increasingly influential role in the creation of
customary international law,” Rebecca Crootof, Change Without Consent: How Customary International Law
Modifies Treaties, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 12), http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2657693 [https://perma.cc/N5SW-K7FK]. Similarly, international
human rights law and international investment law now accord rights to individuals, and allow
individuals to enforce these rights directly against states. See, e.g., North American Free Trade
Agreement ch. 11, Dec. 17, 1992, 107 Stat. 2057, 32 I.L.M. 289; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. No. E., 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
232 Given the accountability gap, scholars are increasingly looking to the law of state
responsibility for guidance. See, e.g., ANDERSON & WAXMAN, supra note 138, at 17 (arguing that
upholding the abstract principles of individual accountability is not worth forgoing the potential
concrete benefits of increasingly autonomous weapon systems); Daniel N. Hammond, Comment,
Autonomous Weapons and the Problem of State Accountability, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 652, 668-71 (2015)
(emphasizing state responsibility for the actions of autonomous weapon systems); Heyns Report,
supra note 186, ¶ 81 (“In general, a stronger emphasis on State as opposed to individual responsibility
may be called for . . . .”).
233 See Hammond, supra note 232, at 669 (explaining that under a system of state liability,
states would internalize the costs of crimes committed by their weapons).
234 Cf. Nollkaemper, supra note 89, at 4 (“If the goal is termination of the crimes and
prevention of their recurrence, individual responsibility is unlikely to do the job.”); see also Calabresi,
supra note 197, at 718 (“[O]ne of the functions of accident law is to reduce the cost of accidents, by
reducing those activities that are accident prone.”); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (1980).
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As a matter of doctrine, holding states accountable for the actions of their
autonomous weapon systems requires only clarifying the applicability of
existing law (rather than creating a new liability regime out of whole cloth).
States are already responsible for all serious violations of international
humanitarian law “attributable to the State under international law.”235
Regardless of whether an autonomous weapon system is analogized to more
conventional weaponry or a soldier, its actions should simply be attributed to
the state fielding it.236 Once the actions of an autonomous weapon system are
attributable to a state, that state is then “under an obligation to make full
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”237 Such
reparation might “take the form of restitution, compensation and satisfaction,
either singly or in combination.”238 If a serious violation results in injurious
damage and it is impossible to restore the situation to its pre-violation state,
the state should pay compensation.239
In practice, states often refuse to take responsibility for actions akin to
war torts. Consider the downing of Iran Air Flight 655. Not only was this
incident notable as one of the most deadly in aviation history—290
passengers and crew members, including 66 children, died—it also involved
an autonomous weapon system, albeit one operated in a semiautonomous
mode.240 In 1988, as the Iran–Iraq War was ending, the USS Vincennes was
patrolling in the Strait of Hormuz.241 The Vincennes was outfitted with the
then-brand-new Aegis Combat System.242 On July 3, after taking fire from
gunboats, the Vincennes pursued them into Iranian territorial waters. While
Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 2(a).
The question of attribution becomes more complicated where a nonstate actor is deploying
the autonomous weapon system (or if the weapon system is itself best analogized to a nonstate
actor). Ultimately, the confusion here is largely a product of the evolving and uncertain state of the
law of state responsibility for the actions of nonstate actors, rather than due to the autonomous
nature of a weapon system. Cf. EMILY CHERTOFF, LARA DOMÍNGUEZ, ZAK MANFREDI & PETER
TZENG, YALE LAW SCH. CTR. FOR GLOB. LEGAL CHALLENGES, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR
NON-STATE ACTORS 18-29 (2015), https://www.law.yale.edu/system/files/yls_glc_state_responsibility
_for_nsas_that_detain_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/NVR3-N2RQ].
237 Draft Articles, supra note 29, art. 31.
238 Id. art. 34. Restitution requires “re-establish[ing] the situation which existed before the
wrongful act was committed.” Id. art. 35. Monetary compensation is required to the extent damage
is not made good by restitution. Id. art. 36. Satisfaction—which may entail acknowledging the
breach, expressing regret, or a formal apology—is required to the extent the damage cannot be made
good by restitution or compensation. Id. art. 37. Interest on sums may be necessary to ensure full
reparation. Id. art. 38. The 2005 Basic Principles expand this list to include rehabilitation and
guarantees of nonrepetition. Basic Principles, supra note 82, ¶ 18; see also Draft Articles, supra note
29, art. 30(b) (imposing an obligation on a state responsible for an internationally wrongful act to
offer guarantees of non-repetition).
239 ICRC COMMENTARY, supra note 9, at 1056.
240 Singer, Robots at War, supra note 131, at 40.
241 Id.
242 Id.
235
236
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there, the Aegis system mislabeled a passenger jet as an F-14 Tomcat. Despite
hard data that suggested the plane was not a threat, the crew nonetheless
authorized the Aegis to fire, resulting in the deaths of all 290 individuals on
board.243 In 1991, Iran brought suit in the International Court of Justice,
claiming that the United States had violated numerous treaty obligations and
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.244 Iran demanded declaratory relief, an
order that the United States cease all unlawful conduct, and reparation for
damages.245 The United States contested the International Court of Justice’s
jurisdiction under treaty and customary law, but in 1996 it agreed to settle for
a $61.8 million compensation payout to the victims’ families.246 The United
States never admitted fault, and no one on board the ship or within the Navy
was ever publicly punished.247
It may be, however, that states’ reluctance to admit fault is linked less to
an unwillingness to accept responsibility than to a disinclination to accept
moral blame. The United States actually offered to compensate the families
of the victims shortly after the tragedy,248 and it was willing to pay millions
of dollars to settle Iran’s claim; it was not willing to publicly acknowledge
fault for the downing of the passenger flight in response to accusations of
having committed a “criminal act,” an “atrocity,” and a “massacre.”249
Similarly, Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles—which stated that Germany
accepted the responsibility for the losses and damages of World War I—was
known as the “War Guilt Clause,” and viewed by Germans as a national
humiliation.250 Many have even suggested it was an important factor in
Hitler’s subsequent rise to power.251 Had it been clear that the article was

Id.
See generally Memorial submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran, Aerial Incident of 3 July
1988 (Iran v. U.S.), 1990 I.C.J. Pleadings 519 (July 24, 1990).
245 Id. at 261.
246 Settlement Agreement, Aerial Incident of 3 July 1988 (Iran v. U.S.), http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/79/11131.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE2W-Y8A6].
247 Cf. Opinion, Blaming the Vincennes’ Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 1988), http://www.
nytimes.com/1988/08/23/opinion/blaming-the-vincennes-victims.html[https://perma.cc/32D9-P988].
248 See Statement by Assistant to the President for Press Relations Fitzwater on United States
Policy Regarding the Accidental Attack on an Iranian Jetliner over the Persian Gulf, 2 PUB. PAPERS
934-35 (July 11, 1988).
249 Fox Butterfield, Iran Falls Short in Drive at U.N. to Condemn U.S. in Airbus Case, N.Y. TIMES
(July 15, 1988), http://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/15/world/iran-falls-short-in-drive-at-un-tocondemn-us-in-airbus-case.html [https://perma.cc/NS6H-45PP].
250 See Versailles Peace Treaty, supra note 50, art. 231; HAJO HOLBORN, A HISTORY OF
MODERN GERMANY: 1840-1945, at 576-77 (1964).
251 See, e.g., ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS: RESTITUTION AND NEGOTIATING
HISTORICAL INJUSTICES, at xxiii (2000).
243
244
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assigning tort-like responsibility rather than criminal-like guilt, it would
hardly have carried the same sting.252
States might actually welcome a clear distinction between war torts and war
crimes and the attendant ability to accept responsibility for injurious wrongs
without accepting blame for criminal acts. Indeed, many states—particularly
the political and military powerhouses that are currently employing
autonomous weapon systems—already voluntarily compensate victims of their
actions in armed conflicts with ex gratia payments.253 The United States, for
example, passed domestic legislation in 1918 requiring it to pay for damages
caused by its foreign forces,254 which it expanded into the Foreign Claims Act
in 1942.255 U.S. claims commissioners often find ways to circumvent certain
liability exclusions, presumably because they believe that making an award is in
the best interests of the United States.256 And many states are party to Status
of Forces Agreements (SOFAs), which often provide a means by which
civilians may pursue tort remedies. For example, in 1953, the United States
ratified the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Status of Forces Agreement,
which established a jurisdictional regime allowing injured citizens in a host
state to pursue civil damages for tortious acts of foreign forces.257 Twenty-six
states are party to the NATO SOFA, and an additional twenty-two nonNATO states have signed the NATO Partnership for Peace Program, under
which they incur the same obligations.258 The NATO SOFA thereby provides
a means for satisfying the “general principle of law . . . that those who cause
injury to others compensate them.”259 These practices suggest that states
might be willing to commit to a more formal agreement codifying their
responsibility for war torts, or at least those war torts committed by
autonomous weapon systems.
252 Robert C. Binkley & A.C. Mahr, A New Interpretation of the “Responsibility” Clause in the
Versailles Treaty, 24 CURRENT HIST. 398, 398 (1926) (describing the article as “an assumption of
liability to pay damages than an admission of war guilt,” much like “a man who undertakes to pay
all the cost of a motor accident than to the plea of guilty entered by an accused criminal”).
253 Paul von Zielbauer, Confusion and Discord in U.S. Compensation to Civilian Victims of War,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/12/world/americas/12iht-abuse.1.
5246758.html [https://perma.cc/2SZJ-HYLU] (noting that, between 2001 and the spring of 2007,
the United States paid approximately $32 million to civilians injured or the families of civilians killed
in Afghanistan and Iraq); see also Witt, supra note 202 (discussing the role of damages payments in
U.S. military strategy).
254 An Act to Give Indemnity for Damages Caused by American Forces Abroad, Pub. L. No.
65-133, 40 Stat. 532 (1918), repealed by Act of Apr. 22, 1943, ch. 67 § 5, 57 Stat. 66 (1943).
255 Foreign Claims Act, ch. 645, 55 Stat. 880 (1942) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2734 (2012)).
256 Witt, supra note 202, at 1479.
257 Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 U.N.T.S. 67.
258 Signatures of Partnership for Peace Framework Document, N. ATLANTIC TREATY ORG. http://
www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_82584.htm [https://perma.cc/7L76-XPGT] (last updated Jan. 10, 2012).
259 Reisman, supra note 229, at 514.
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2. The Argument for Strict Liability
While strict liability may not be appropriate for all war torts, states should
be held strictly liable for the actions of the autonomous weapon systems they
field.260
Tort law ostensibly has two levels of liability for apportioning
responsibility for unintended accidents: strict liability and negligence
liability.261 Under strict liability, an actor is held responsible for any injury
caused by her behavior; under negligence liability, an actor is held responsible
to the extent her failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in an injury. Strict
liability is relatively easily determined; evaluations of negligence require
complicated evaluations of facts, duties, and harm. As a result, selecting
between these two regimes has significant implications for who bears the
brunt of unintended mishaps: “Under strict liability, the costs of faultless
accidents fall on injurers; under negligence, they fall on victims.”262
In domestic tort law, strict liability is often employed in situations where
it is too difficult to prove that a specific defendant failed to exercise due care
or, even if there was a failure, that the failure caused the injurious harm. As
weapon systems have become more complex, the causal chain of
accountability for unintended consequences of their use has become more
attenuated.263 A person using a sword intends to harm the person he cuts;
regardless of whether the victim is a wounded solider or civilian child, the
wielder is acting intentionally. Similarly, when a bomber drops an arsenal
indiscriminately in a civilian area, the bombardier is acting recklessly. As
temporal and geographic distances between the decision to use lethal force
and the consequences of that action increase, however, the causal chain of
accountability is weakened. Up until now, however, it has at least been
260 To the extent a victim is responsible for his or her injury, a state should be able to employ
the contributory negligence defense, but the burden of proof should rest on the state to demonstrate
that the victim knowingly assumed an unreasonable risk.
261 The dividing line between strict and negligence liability is less sharp than it first appears.
There are many forms of negligence that operate like strict liability in practice: the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur presumes negligence from the resulting injury absent evidence of how the defendant
behaved, and negligence per se presumes negligence from a statutory violation. See Kenneth S.
Abraham, Strict Liability in Negligence, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 271 (2012) (discussing three examples of
what he terms “strict liability in negligence”: the objective standard, the perfect-compliance rule,
and the thin-skull rule); id. at 283 n.35 (listing “res ipsa loquitur, respondeat superior, liability for
breach of a nondelegable duty, and joint and several liability for a single, theoretically divisible but
practically indivisible harm” as “exhibit[ing] some feature of strict liability”).
262 Jules L. Coleman, The Structure of Tort Law, 97 YALE L.J. 1233, 1235 (1988) (reviewing
WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987),
and STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW (1987)).
263 Playing off of von Clausewitz, this has been described as the “fog of technology.” Duncan Hollis,
The Fog of Technology and International Law, OPINIO JURIS (May 15, 2015, 8:59 AM), http://
opiniojuris.org/2015/05/15/the-fog-of-technology-and-international-law/ [https://perma.cc/668F-9JLU].
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plausible to argue that an individual’s decision to use lethal force was a
proximate cause of that decision’s consequences.
Because of their capacity for independent and unpredictable action,264
autonomous weapon systems break that chain. It will be nearly impossible to
prove that an individual failed to exercise due care (either in the
manufacturing, programming, or use of an autonomous weapon systems) or
that the injuries caused by an autonomous weapon system were due to such a
failure. In accordance with the reasoning in many products liability cases,265
a strict liability regime is most appropriate to address the difficulty with
tracing the causal chain of injuries caused by autonomous weapon systems.
Additionally, strict liability is usually applied to lawful but inherently
dangerous activities, such as possession of an animal with dangerous
propensities or engagement in abnormally dangerous activities.266 Strict
liability is more appropriate in such cases; under a negligence regime, the
responsible party could escape liability by conforming to the legal standard of
care, even if there was no reason to engage in the activity in the first place.267
Meanwhile, strict liability incentivizes those engaging in an inherently
dangerous activity to consider both the level of care and the level of
activity.268
Not only are the independent actions of autonomous weapon systems not
fully predictable, they are also inherently dangerous. Autonomous weapon
systems are designed and intended to kill human beings and wreak
destruction; their capacity for independent action means they may sometimes
kill the wrong human beings or destroy the wrong object. The use of
autonomous weapon systems in armed conflict is therefore “ultrahazardous”—it involves a risk of serious harm that cannot be eliminated, even
if utmost care is exercised.269 Given that the risk of harm can be minimized
See supra subsection II.A.3.
Cf. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)
(“[P]ublic policy demands that responsibility be fixed wherever it will most effectively reduce the
hazards to life and health inherent in defective products that reach the market. It is evident that the
manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and guard against the recurrence of others, as the public
cannot.”); se also Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 On the Approximation of the Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective
Products, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29, 29 (“[L]iability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole
means of adequately solving the problem, peculiar to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production . . . .”).
266 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 509, 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
267 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 178 (7th ed. 2007).
268 Calabresi, supra note 197, at 718; Shavell, supra note 234, at 3, 7, 11-12, 18-19.
269 Rylands v. Fletcher [1868] LRE & I. App. 3 (HL); see also Langan v. Valicopters, 567 P.2d
218, 221 (Wash. 1977) (describing the six factors used to determine whether an activity is abnormally
dangerous, at least five of which apply to the use of autonomous weapon systems in armed conflicts);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (same).
264
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only by the entity responsible for the activity, it is appropriate for that party
to bear the full brunt of the consequences of such use.
In addition to the inevitability of autonomous weapon systems being
involved in a normal accident,270 they are also at risk of hacking, spoofing, and
other such risks.271 A strict liability regime would give added impetus to states
to limit hacking opportunities—either through increasing security measures
or by minimizing the deployment of such weaponry.272
In short, there are a number of arguments for regulating the actions of
autonomous weapon systems through strict liability. Due to their capacity for
unpredictable action and the corresponding difficulty of establishing who did
not exercise due care in the design, manufacture, and use of an autonomous
weapon system, it will be nearly impossible to establish legal fault under a
negligence standard.273 In contrast, a strict liability regime places the costs of
employing an autonomous weapon system squarely on the state (subject to a
contributory negligence defense) and is easier to enforce; both of these will
result in greater payouts to victims. This will encourage states to take care both
in how they use autonomous weapon systems (ranging from increasing security
measures to only using them in environments where there is little risk to
unlawful targets) and in how often they use autonomous weapon systems.
Ideally, strict liability will ultimately deter excessive usage of autonomous
weapon systems and thereby reduce the overall number of tragic accidents.
3. Forms and Forums
Given the varied sources of international legal obligations, it is difficult to
predict how a war torts regime might evolve. Soft law may develop from states’
domestic laws and policies, international non-binding resolutions or
declarations, or industry practice. New customary international law may
materialize as state practice solidifies into opinio juris sive necessitatis.274 States
might conclude a treaty codifying norms or creating new ones.275 Judicial

270 See supra subsection II.A.3.
271 SCHARRE, supra note 5, at 15.
272 Cf. Shavell, supra note 234, at 3. Similarly, U.S.

lawmakers are currently discussing to what
extent an automobile’s vulnerability to cyberattacks constitutes a safety defect, which would make
manufacturers strictly liable for accidents resulting from hacks. Mike Spector, Is a Hacked Vehicle
Also Defective?, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2015, 7:02 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/is-a-hackedvehicle-also-defective-1440457334 [https://perma.cc/US99-RQ29].
273 Rather, holding a state strictly liable is akin to joint enterprise liability, insofar as the state
can be conceived as a stand-in representing the designers, manufacturers, programmers, and
deployers of autonomous weapon systems.
274 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993 (including “international custom” as one of the primary sources of international law).
275 Id. art. 38(1)(a) (including “conventions” as one of the primary sources of international law).
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opinions and academic writings may elucidate confusing concepts.276 Nor is it
obvious, as a normative matter, what is the best form for new regulations
regarding new technology. Treaties are clear statements of international legal
obligations, but they are relatively inflexible; customary international law and
soft law are responsive to state interests and new technological developments,
but they are relatively weak: it can be difficult to identify when a new
customary law norm is established, and soft law sources are not legally binding.
An ideal international legal regime for the regulation of autonomous
weapon systems would exploit the differing strengths of the different sources
of international law. Accordingly, I have suggested elsewhere that states
negotiate a broad framework convention that can be augmented and expanded
by specialized additional protocols, soft and interstitial law, and domestic
law.277 One of these additional protocols could outline an integrated
international and domestic liability regime for autonomous weapon systems.
At the very least, it should reiterate and clarify the relevance of the law of
state responsibility. It could also clarify common definitions, describe
overarching regulatory aims, and require member states to pass legislation
creating domestic liability for both war crimes and war torts (which may
entail waiving sovereign immunity).
Ambitiously, a treaty might establish an independent tribunal for
autonomous weapon systems’ war torts, much like the ICC or other
specialized criminal tribunals.278 Theoretically, the International Court of
Justice could also serve as a forum for such suits, but its jurisdiction
limitations will reduce its usefulness. The Court has jurisdiction only in
contentious cases on the basis of state consent: states may agree to bring a
specific issue before the Court by submitting a compromis,279 or states may
accept the Court’s jurisdiction as generally compulsory.280 Many powerful
states have refused to accept or have withdrawn from the Court’s compulsory
jurisdiction,281 and a state allegedly responsible for an autonomous weapon
system’s internationally wrongful act would have little incentive to submit a
compromis. States employing autonomous weapon systems might be more
276 Id. art. 38(1)(d) (noting that judicial decisions and academic commentary provide a
“subsidiary means for the determination of the rules of law”).
277 Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1897-99.
278 Cf. Steintz, supra note 18 (proposing an “International Court of Civil Justice”).
279 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36(1), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, 33
U.N.T.S. 993.
280 Id. art. 36(2).
281 Only 72 of the 193 U.N. member states are subject to the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction.
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. JUST., http://www.icjcij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 [https://perma.cc/Y3YF-9TZ5] (last updated Apr. 15, 2016).
Notably, four members of the Security Council—China, France, Russia, and the United States—do
not currently accept compulsory jurisdiction.

1398

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1347

willing to submit to the limited jurisdiction of a specialized tribunal, however,
as it will not open the possibility of other kinds of suits.
A carefully tailored independent tribunal would also help alleviate the
plaintiff problem. Tort suits are usually initiated by the injured party, which
seemingly ensures that only important wrongs are litigated. However, there
are significant drawbacks to limiting war torts plaintiffs to either states or
individuals. There are myriad political reasons a state might decide against
bringing an otherwise strong war tort suit against another state, and
individuals often do not have the resources or wherewithal to bring suits
against states themselves. But tort law is not the only legal regime where
accountability for wrongs is sometimes foregone; prosecutorial discretion
serves a similar aim in criminal law. To the extent war torts are wrongful acts
that affect the international legal order, it would be appropriate to charge
independent
prosecutorial-like
actors—call
them
“International
Representative Plaintiffs”—with bringing war tort suits against states on
behalf of harmed individuals. These International Representative Plaintiffs
could have the independent power to determine when a suit should be
brought, and states and individuals could also petition them to consider
specific cases.
An integrated international and domestic liability regime would be a
familiar extension of the way international and domestic liability regimes
currently interact to create more effective enforcement mechanisms. Treaties
often require states to pass national legislation implementing the treaty’s
provisions without mandating the specifics of how that is to be done. For
example, the 1949 Geneva Conventions oblige state parties to search for and
try or extradite persons alleged to have committed or alleged to have ordered
the commission of war crimes,282 and the Chemical Weapons Convention
requires state parties to, “in accordance with [their] constitutional process,
adopt the necessary measures to implement its obligations under this
Convention” and proceeds to detail certain crucial requirements.283
However, the international community need not collectively organize to
create tort liability for the actions of autonomous weapon systems. One nationstate could do so singlehandedly, simply by passing domestic legislation with
universal jurisdiction. In fact, depending on the alleged tort violation, it is
possible that the Alien Tort Statute could already be used to prosecute
individuals for war torts caused by autonomous weapon systems.284 However,
282 First Geneva Convention, supra note 36, art. 49; Second Geneva Convention, supra note
36, art. 50; Third Geneva Convention, supra note 36, art. 129; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note
36, art. 146.
283 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 38, art. VII.
284 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the ATS provides jurisdiction only for violations of
customary international law that either were recognized as such at the time the statute was adopted in
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because of the political problems associated with attempting to hold foreign
states accountable for international law violations in domestic courts285 and the
foreign policy conflicts legislation like the ATS engenders,286 it would be far
preferable to have an overarching international war torts regime than a
domestic one.
4. The Time Is Now
When liability for war torts is created is less important than whether it is
created—but timing may affect what is possible. States can await the
inevitable tragic accident before constructing a responsive tort liability
regime, but it would be far preferable if they took proactive action.
Timing is always an issue in attempting to regulate new technology.287 It
is of particular importance in the international legal order, however, as the
lack of a single authoritative lawmaker renders international law prone to
reactive lawmaking.
There is much to be said for reactive lawmaking when attempting to
regulate a poorly understood new technology. First, it allows for a great deal
of flexibility; instead of preemptively making rules or regulatory standards
that will quickly become outdated, legal developments will track
technological ones. Second, it avoids inadvertently constraining beneficial
innovation through overbroad rules. If autonomous weapon systems are
eventually better able to comply with the law of armed conflict than human
soldiers, for example, it would be unfortunate to ban them at this early stage
of development. Finally, and perhaps most influentially, reactive lawmaking
1789, or, if based on current international law, are “defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the 18th century paradigms.” Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). Federal courts have
found torture; cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; genocide; war crimes; crimes against humanity;
summary execution; prolonged arbitrary detention; and forced disappearance actionable under the
ATS. See Pamela J. Stephens, Spinning Sosa: Federal Common Law, the Alien Tort Statute, and Judicial
Restraint, 25 B.U. INT’L L.J. 1, 5 (2007). If the actions of autonomous weapon systems result in such
violations, the ATS may allow for prosecutions in U.S. courts if the statute’s other jurisdictional
requirements are satisfied. See supra note 16 (detailing other jurisdictional limitations).
285 See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Christopher A. Whytock, Judging in Global Context:
Domestic Courts, International Relations, and Foreign Sovereign Immunity 5-6 (Nov. 6, 2015)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
286 The ATS problematically pits the judicial branch against the executive. See, e.g., Curtis A.
Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Judicial Foreign Policy We Cannot Afford, WASH. POST, (Apr. 19, 2009),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/17/AR2009041702859.html
[https://perma.cc/V96M-9F93].
287 See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant, The Growing Gap Between Emerging Technologies and the Law, in
THE GROWING GAP BETWEEN EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES AND LEGAL-ETHICAL
OVERSIGHT: THE PACING PROBLEM 19 (Gary E. Marchant, Braden R. Allenby & Joseph R.
Herkert eds., 2011); Lyria Bennett Moses, Recurring Dilemmas: The Law’s Race to Keep up with
Technological Change, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 239.
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has the benefit of inertia. It appears costless, as states need not invest time in
treaty negotiations or norm-building conversations. Indeed, some suggested
proactive regulations of new technology have proven to be utterly
superfluous.288 When an autonomous weapon system inevitably takes action
that results in a serious violation of international humanitarian law, the
responsible state will advocate for the most politically advantageous solution,
the international community will respond, and international law will evolve.
But the evolutionary approach to lawmaking has a major drawback: it
foregoes a precious opportunity to use law responsibly to channel the
development of this new kind of weaponry.289 Technology and law have long
been dancing, and they regularly trade the lead—this is a situation where law
should seize it.290 International law—even treaty law—is not set in stone;
instead, it is constantly evolving in response to state action and interests.291
Left unregulated, states might employ increasingly autonomous weapon
systems in ways that undermine hard-won humanitarian protections.292 The
stakes here are too high to leave to the vagaries of responsive state practice.
Not only may acting now make it possible to create tort liability for the
actions of autonomous weapon systems, it is a precipitous time for legal
intervention. States—particularly those states fielding increasingly autonomous
weapon systems—are participating in international conversations on the subject
and expressing an interest in developing regulations.293
5. A Useful Test Case
Why would states create a liability regime for an autonomous weapon
system’s war torts? Consider the failure to create tort remedies for
288 See Colin B. Picker, A View from 40,000 Feet: International Law and the Invisible Hand of
Technology, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 149, 186-87 (2001) (providing the example of proposals for weather
modification treaties in the 1960s and 1970s that have proven to be superfluous today, because
“weather modification has proven to be considerably more complicated than originally believed”).
289 Additionally, reactive lawmaking is often reactive and overbroad, the product of the
perceived need to avoid similar future tragedies rather than the considered evaluation of the most
appropriate legal regime.
290 See Timothy Coughlin, The Future of Robotic Weaponry and the Law of Armed Conflict:
Irreconcilable Differences?, 17 U.C. LONDON JURIS. REV. 67, 67 (2011) (“Answering to different masters,
technological development and legal structures are in a constant state of ebb and flow, with each pushing
the contours of the other in a choreographed exchange of concessions and compromises.”).
291 Crootof, supra note 231 (discussing various means of treaty modification, including formal
amendment, supersession, adaptive interpretation, and modification by subsequently-developed
customary international law).
292 See Crootof, Killer Robots, supra note 4, at 1894-96. For a discussion of how the delayed
creation of international regulations can have significant and irreversible real world effects, see
Picker, supra note 288, at 186 (discussing how the delay in the international law of ocean management
has contributed to overfishing, pollution, and other irreversible harms).
293 See supra note 138.
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environmental damage, notwithstanding decades of effort from activists and
civil society294: While the issues with transboundary pollution are clear and
obvious, states remain reluctant to accept direct liability or to create tort
liability for private actors.295 Given the likelihood of accidents in armed
conflicts and the high stakes associated with the use of lethal force, why would
states have any interest in creating a new liability regime?
In environmental law, the alternative to tort liability is no liability.296 At
first glance, it appears that is the case here: if no one can be held directly or
indirectly liable under existing law, there appears to be little incentive for
states to create a new liability regime. However, an autonomous weapon
system will eventually and inevitably act in a way that results in significant
death or destruction with no one acting willfully. When that occurs, there will
be widespread outcry to hold some person or entity accountable. Absent a
regime or theory of tort liability for such actions, it is likely that criminal law
will be read to create ex post liability for a “crime” that calls out for
punishment, much as occurred at Nuremberg. The alternative to tort liability
will not be no liability—instead, it will likely be expanded criminal liability.
And not only is this morally questionable, it threatens to undermine the
legitimacy of all of international criminal law.297
Not only do states have a vested interest in creating a tort liability regime,
the unpredictability and inherently dangerous nature of autonomous weapon
systems justify treating responsibility for this weapons technology
differently. Unlike other weapons, autonomous weapon systems are capable
of acting independently, breaking the causal chain between an individual’s
decision to deploy them and the target of these weapons’ ultimate use of lethal
force. And, unlike other robots, autonomous weapon systems are intended to
kill people—they just are not supposed to kill the wrong people. The
combination of these two factors strongly favor imposing strict liability. In
contrast, when a non-autonomous or nonlethal weapon system malfunctions
and causes a serious violation of international humanitarian law, a negligence
standard may be more appropriate. It is therefore possible to draw a line in
the sand and create a limited strict liability tort regime governing the actions
of autonomous weapon systems. Indeed, it may prove a useful test case: if it
is a successful counterpart to international criminal law, states may consider
the utility of further expanding state liability for war torts.

Sachs, supra note 12, at 838.
See id. at 838-39 (“Effective tort liability rules, it seems are the Yeti of international environmental
law—pursued for years, sometimes spotted in rough outlines, but remarkably elusive in practice.”).
296 Id. at 839-40.
297 See supra subsection II.B.4.
294
295

1402

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 164: 1347

This Article’s proposal naturally raises the question of whether states
should be responsible and provide compensation for all war torts—not just
those committed by autonomous weapon systems. Furthermore, why
shouldn’t state responsibility extend to encompass all unanticipated harm to
civilians resulting from actions attributable to a state?298 Addressing these
questions and outlining a comprehensive international war torts regime akin to
what has developed in international criminal law is beyond the scope of this
Article. I look forward to exploring these and related issues in future work.
CONCLUSION
The conversation on accountability for the actions of autonomous weapon
systems has been trapped in the language of “war crimes.” International
criminal law is useful in assigning individual liability in situations where a
human being employs autonomous weapon systems recklessly or with the
intention of committing a war crime. However, it is toothless in situations
where no individual acts willfully.
This is not a failure of international criminal law; this is a feature, not a
bug. Criminal law aims to prohibit certain actions altogether, through
stigmatization and punishment, and individual criminal liability allows for
the evaluation of whether someone is guilty of a moral wrong. This
framework is not appropriate when attempting to regulate the use of a
valuable but sometimes unpredictable and dangerous weapon. Instead, an
international tort liability regime is the best solution to the autonomous
weapon system accountability gap.299
At present, “[w]hether civilian casualties [in armed conflicts] are merely
tragic accidents or war crimes depends on mens rea, and the intentions of
those who order attacks and carry them out.”300 International criminal law
exists to hold individuals accountable for war crimes; a complementary legal
regime is necessary to hold states accountable for their war torts.

298 See Scott T. Paul, The Duty to Make Amends to the Victims of Armed Conflict, 22 TUL. J. INT’L
L. & COMP. L. 87 (2013); Riesman, supra note 22; Ronen, supra note 22.
299 Cf. Calabresi, supra note 197, at 716 (“Our society is not committed to preserving life at any
cost. In its broadest sense, this rather unpleasant notion should be obvious. Wars are fought. The
University of Mississippi is integrated.”).
300 Peter Asaro, Ethical Issues Raised by Autonomous Weapon Systems, in INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, AUTONOMOUS WEAPON SYSTEMS: TECHNICAL, MILITARY, LEGAL AND HUMANITARIAN
ASPECTS 49, 51 (2014), http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/4221-002-autonomousweapons-systems-full-report%20%281%29.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y44-3J9X].

